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CASE NOTES
Civil Procedure-Res Judicata Held Inapplicable to Section 1983 Ac-
tion Where Issues of Procedural Due Process Were Not Raised in Prior
State Litigation-Plaintiff's probationary appointment as a teacher in the
New York City public school system was terminated by the Board of
Education for reasons of mental unfitness and incompetence. The Board had
based its action on reports damaging to plaintiff submitted by the principal of
his school and the findings of medical examinations conducted by staff
psychologists and physicians. As a result of the Board's finding of mental
unfitness, plaintiff was disqualified from teaching elsewhere in the school
system. Plaintiff had unsuccessfully contested his firing in two separate state
court proceedings,' alleging that the charges against him were without basis
in fact and were motivated by the personal dislike of his former principal,
who, he maintained, had chosen to pursue a vendetta against him. Thereaf-
ter, plaintiff brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York seeking reinstatement, back pay and damages, and asserting for the first
time that he was denied procedural due process in that, prior to his discharge,
written reasons were not given supporting the Board's action and an eviden-
tiary hearing was not held. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19832
which provides a civil remedy for the deprivation of federally guaranteed
rights or privileges by one acting under color of state law. Res judicata was
raised as a defense and the district court dismissed the complaint. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the defense-of res
judicata was unavailable where procedural due process claims arising under
section 1983 had not been previously litigated. Lombard v. Board of Educa-
tion, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
Section 19833 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
The congressional purposes of this section, as defined by the Supreme Court
in Monroe v. Pape,4 were threefold: (1) to override certain kinds of state laws;
1. These proceedings were brought pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963),
which permits an action to be brought against officers of the state. The final disposition of one of
them has been reported. Lombard v. Board of Educ., 40 App. Div. 2d 1081, 337 N.Y.S.2d 1003
(2d Dep't 1972) (mem.), leave to appeal denied, 31 N.Y.2d 648, 341 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. Id.
4. 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961) (Chicago policemen who abused their authority held to hav
acted "under color of" state law for purposes of § 1983 claims against them). This case is
primarily responsible for § 1983's position as a major source of federal litigation. See Aldisert,
Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity
and the Federal Caseload, 1973 Law & Soc. Order 557, 563. See generally Chevigny, Section
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(2) to provide a federal remedy where state law was inadequate; and (3) to
"provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice."5 In addition, however, the Court,
noting that the statute "is cast in general language," 6 gave broad scope to
section 1983, stating: "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked."
7
Expressly relying on this statement, the court in Lombard refused to apply
res judicata to procedural due process claims which had not been submitted
to and decided by the state court.9 It was conceded that had the "constitu-
tional issue . . . actually [been] raised in the state court . . . the litigant has
made his choice and may not have two bites at the cherry." 10 Nevertheless,
the court did not view the problem as one of res judicata, despite the fact that
section 1983 provides an alternative to the state forum, rather than a second
forum, in which to litigate." The court found three policy reasons for this
holding.
1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1352 (1970); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1486 (1969).
5. 365 U.S. at 174.
6. Id. at 183.
7. Id. see McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
8. Res judicata (or claim preclusion, as it is sometimes called), and the related doctrine of
collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), are methods of attaching finality to competent judicial
judgments by precluding redundant litigation. Res judicata "provides that when a court of
competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties
to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound 'not only as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose.' " Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948) (citation omitted). However, where a new cause of action is alleged, and the parties are the
same, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar relitigation of only those issues that were
necessary to the determination of the prior suit. Id. at 597-98. The distinction between res
judicata and collateral estoppel has been described by the Supreme Court: "[U]nder the doctrine
of res judicata, a judgment 'on the merits' in a prior suit involving the same parties or their
privies bars a second suit based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, on the other hand, such a judgment precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and
determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of action as the
second suit." Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). The court in
Lombard discusses res judicata, since the plaintiff's complaint under § 1983 alleges essentially the
same cause of action that was litigated in the state court. The applicability of collateral estoppel,
however, is also discussed. 502 F.2d at 637. See note 32 infra and accompanying text. See also
Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and Anglo-American Law,
39 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1940), for historical background. See generally McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (pt. II), 60 Va. L.
Rev. 250, 251-59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Federalism and Section 1983].
9. 502 F.2d at 635.
10. Id. at 636-37.
11. Id. at 636. If the federal issues could not have been raised in the prior action, res judicata
cannot apply. Robbins v. Police Pension Fund, 321 F. Supp. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1974] CASE NOTES
First, as indicated,' 2 to require the plaintiff to raise his constitutional claim
in the state action would be contrary to section 1983's goal of providing a
supplementary federal remedy.' 3 Yet, the Supreme Court has never decided a
case in which the plaintiff pursued a state court action to final judgment
without raising constitutional questions and then attempted to litigate con-
stitutional claims arising out of the same cause of action in federal court under
section 1983.11 A state court, of course, has full power to hear all issues in
dispute, including constitutional ones.' 5 The federal courts have almost
uniformly applied res judicata to bar section 1983 actions brought subsequent
to state court proceedings on the same cause of action.' 6
12. As a general rule, § 1983 "does not provide the springboard for an unhappy state litigant
to raise his federal claims de novo in federal court." PI Enterprises, Inc. v. Cataldo, 457 F.2d
1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1972) (civil rights suit to have town ordinance declared invalid precluded by
a prior state adjudication of the constitutional issues). See Thistlethwaite v. City of New York,
497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3282 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1974) (No.
74-524).
13. In line with the establishment of § 1983 as a supplementary federal remedy, the Supreme
Court has abolished the requirement that state remedies must be exhausted prior to bringing a
§ 1983 suit. E.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974) (dictum) (no exhaustion of
state judicial remedies required for relief from violations of first and fourteenth amendment
rights); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (constitutional challenge to state welfare law
and regulations required no exhaustion of administrative remedies); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963) (no exhaustion of state administrative remedies required before
seeking relief from school segregation). The Second Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court
decisions as requiring that adequate state administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to a
§ 1983 action. Piano v. Baker, No. 74-1527, at 98-99 (2d Cir. OcL I1, 1974); Blanton v. State
Univ., 489 F.2d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567-69 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); see Federalism and Section 1983. at 271-76; Comment,
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 537
(1974); Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1201
(1968). See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 210 n.42 (1974).
14. See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973).
15. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-03 (1973); United States v. Bank of New
York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479 (1936); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I WheaL) 304,
340-41 (1816); cf. Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior
State-Court Determinations, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1360 (1967). See generally ALl Study of the Division
of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 163-69 (official draft 1965).
16. E.g., Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3306
(U.S. Nov. 25, 1974) (§ 1983 suit alleging deprivation of first amendment rights precluded by
prior state action in which constitutional issues were not raised); Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v.
Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974) (determination by state
court of limited jurisdiction foreclosed bringing same cause of action under Civil Rights Act);
Johnson v. Department of Water & Power, 450 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1072 (1972) (civil service employee contesting his discharge: "PVlhere, as here,
the same facts have been the subject of state actions and final judgments have been entered there,
the principle of res judicata applies.'); Lackawanna PBA v. Balen, 446 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (fourteenth amendment claims held barred by prior state adjudication: "The Civil
Rights Act ... does not permit a second bite at the cherry.'); Taylor v. New York City Transit
Authority, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970) (state judicial affirmance of administrative agency's
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Second, the court reasoned that the choice of forum permitted by section
1983 should be applied flexibly so as to permit the state court to decide issues
of state statutory construction and federal courts to decide issues involving
constitutional rights.' 7 This proposition is sound insofar as it is the accepted
practice of the federal court to retain jurisdiction when it is required to
withhold adjudication of federal claims, under the abstention doctrine,' 8 until
discharge of city employee held to bar a subsequent due process claim under § 1983); Scott v.
California Sup. Ct., 426 F.2d 300, 301 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (§ 1983 suit: "California had
jurisdiction and [complainant] lost his case there. . . . It is a clear situation of res judicata.");
Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (prior state court
judgment that plaintiff's disbarment was valid foreclosed litigation under § 1983 of issues that
were not raised in the prior action, but might have been); Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (teacher discharge case: § 1983 action
barred by prior state suit even though constitutional issues were not litigated); Mertes v. Mertes,
350 F. Supp. 472 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973) (mem.) (procedural due process issues
that could have been raised in prior state action barred under § 1983); cf. Kabelka v. City of New
York, 353 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discharged city employee: due process claims actually
litigated in state proceeding held conclusive in § 1983 suit); Morey v. Independent School Dist.,
312 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1970).
However, at least two cases have not applied res judicata to § 1983 claims where it would seem
appropriate, preferring to view the issue as the narrower one of collateral estoppel despite the
apparent identity of parties and claims. As a result, constitutional issues that could have been
raised in the prior action were litigated under § 1983. Miller v. Board of Educ., 452 F.2d 894 (6th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (issue of whether plaintiff had constitutional right to public employment
decided in federal court although it could have been raised in the state action); Jenson v. Olson,
353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965) (first amendment claims that could have been raised in prior action
between the same parties nevertheless decided by federal court under § 1983); accord, Chism v.
Price, 457 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1972) (previously decided factual issues precluded, but
constitutional issues not previously raised decided on the merits); Avins v. Mangum, 450 F.2d
932 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum: collateral estoppel found applicable although res judicata would seem
appropriate).
The Supreme Court has admitted in dictum that "res judicata has been held to be fully
applicable to a civil rights action brought under § 1983." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497
(1973) (citations omitted). However, Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Rodriguez, expressed his
doubts on this issue: "[I]n view of the purposes underlying enactment of the Act-in particular,
the congressional misgivings about the ability and inclination of state courts to enforce federally
protected rights . . . that conclusion may well be in error." Id. at 509 n.14 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See generally Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Section 1983 Litigation in
a Federal Court, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 185 (1974).
17. 502 F.2d at 636.
18. The abstention doctrine, first formulated in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 501 (1941), has been characterized as a "well-established procedure . . . aimed at the
avoidance of unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly administered
state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of our federal system. . . .In the
service of this doctrine, which this Court has applied in many different contexts, no principle has
found more consistent or clear expression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate the
constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until the state courts have been
afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them." Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176
(1959). The abstention doctrine, in conjunction with the exhaustion requirement, see note 13
supra, may cause difficulties for the § 1983 plaintiff who seeks a federal forum and who raises
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potentially dispositive state issues are decided by state courts. 19 Nevertheless,
in terms of judicial economy, the holding invites litigants not to raise
constitutional issues in the state courts, thereby giving those litigants an extra
bite at the "cherry [sic]."12 0
Third, Lombard found res judicata inapplicable because to deny appellant
a section 1983 cause of action at this juncture would leave him without a
remedy, since his failure to raise constitutional issues in the state court action
necessarily precluded him from appealing the state court judgment to the
Supreme Court.21 Moreover, the court noted that while "other opinions which
in language support an extension of the res judicata rule [they] did not
involve a claim of deprivation of procedural due process . . . ,,"2 There is,
however, a recent Second Circuit holding to the contrary,23 and besides,
application of res judicata always precludes further litigation of the case.24
Furthermore, there is no basis in law for placing procedural due process in an
exalted position when other courts have applied res judicata principles in
similar factual situations involving equally important constitutional rights.25
While Lombard viewed the appellant as remediless, 26 in fact, as the court
itself intimates, 27 he may have had a cause of action for malpractice against
his attorney of record in the state court proceeding, for under prior law, the
constitutional issues should have been raised in that action.2 8
both federal and state issues. For a discussion of these difficulties in a § 1983 context and their
effect on preclusion see Federalism and-Section 1983, at 265-71. See also H. Friendly, Federal
Jurisdiction: A General View 95 (1973).
19. The court cited two cases that demonstrate the Second Circuit's treatment of the
abstention doctrine: Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971) (proper action for
district court in abstention situation was to retain jurisdiction pending state court determination
of state issues); Coleman v. Ginsberg, 428 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1970) (retention of jurisdiction
pending state court interpretation of state law better than dismissal of complaint).
20. 502 F.2d at 637. The Fordhan Law Review Editors split five to five on the issue of
whether the court intended to use the word "apple." See Minutes of Meeting of the Board of
Editors, Nov. 1, 1974, at 15, col. 3 (R. Cirillo ed.); cf. Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1240 n.206 (1974).
21. 502 F.2d at 636. Moreover, plaintiff had, in the state court action, asserted that his
dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, id. at 635, the hallmarks of a due process allegation.
22. Id. at 636.
23. See note 28 infra.
24. "The [prior] judgment puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be brought
into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some other factor
invalidating the judgment." Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); see Tuti v.
Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply
Co., 430 F.2d 38, 45 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. E.g., Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3306
(U.S. Nov. 25, 1974) (freedom of speech); Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974) (freedom of association).
26. 502 F.2d at 636.
27. "[A]ppellant [may have] inadvertently or through his lawyer's mistake failed to raise the
constitutional claim .... " Id.
28. In its opinion, the court in Lombard did not discuss Taylor v. New York City Transit
Authority, 433 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1970). That case, decided in the same circuit as Lombard,
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After eliminating the res judicata issue, the court then viewed the issue as
whether appellant had "waived" his constitutional right to raise his federal
claims in federal court. 29 "Waiver" requires proof of "an act or omission on
the part of the one charged with the waiver fairly evidencing an intention
permanently to surrender the right alleged to have been waived. '30 Treating
the issue in these terms further encourages litigants to withhold their pro-
cedural due process claims in the state action and injects an element that is
traditionally foreign to res judicata doctrine. 3'
The court then considered collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), and found
the action not barred for the same reasons advanced for not applying res
judicata. In addition, the court suggested that the state court decision
upholding his discharge did not necessarily rest on a finding of mental
incompetence, 32 but that the state court holding in effect let stand a finding
that he was mentally incompetent "without giving him an opportunity in any
tribunal to confront his accusers in an evidentiary type of hearing. '33 Pre-
sumably, however, the state court proceedings did afford him precisely this
opportunity, 34 even if the Board of Education hearing was, as the court
avers, 35 less than fair.
specifically held that procedural due process claims not raised in the prior state proceeding were
barred under the doctrine of res judicata in a § 1983 action. Id. at 668. Not only, therefore, did
Taylor point up the consequences of not raising the constitutional claims in the state action, but it
also conclusively showed that procedural due process claims do not enjoy a preferred position
with respect to res judicata. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
29. 502 F.2d at 636.
30. Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1356 (3d ed. 1969) (citation omitted). "Waiver" usually
entails an informed choice. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, No. 73-1883, at
5 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 1974). For a discussion of waiver in habeas corpus contexts, see Pope v.
Swenson, 395 F.2d 321, 322-24 (8th Cir. 1968).
31. The issue of "waiver" usually arises in cases where a party is alleged to have waived his
right to seek relief on a particular legal theory because he had previously elected to pursue a
remedy inconsistent with that theory. As such, waiver is not a res judicata principle, but rather
falls under the rubric of election of remedies. See generally 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice
0.405, at 761-65 (2d ed. 1974). The question of waiver may also arise where a plaintiff's § 1983
complaint is dismissed for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies when those remedies
are no longer available. See Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969), discussed In
Federalism and Section 1983, at 293-95.
32. For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must have been necessary to the holding in the
prior action. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876), approved, Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948). Thus, even if an issue was not raised and litigated in the prior
action, if it was necessarily assumed by the court's holding, further litigation thereon may be
precluded.
33. 502 F.2d at 637.
34. Article 78 proceedings are brought before the New York Supreme Court, which is
comprised of courts of general jurisdiction empowered to conduct full evidentiary trials. The fact
that Lombard's petitions were denied without an evidentiary hearing does not mean he was
denied the opportunity for one. Moreover, the state court judge, in denying one of Lombard's
petitions, specifically stated: " 'The court is also of the opinion that the hearing accorded
petitioner was proper .... .' " Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d at 635, quoting from the
unreported state court denial of Lombard's petition. See also note 1 supra.
35. 502 F.2d at 637; see note 34 supra.
CASE NOTES
On the merits, the court acknowledged that since appellant did not have
tenure, his expectation of continued employment was not a property interest
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 36 Lombard
was, however, deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty, it was held, in
that the circumstances of his dismissal not only deprived him of further
employment within the New York City school system but also imposed a
"stigma" which "[i]f. . . unsupportable in fact . . . does grievous harm to
appellant's chances for further employment, as indeed the record demon-
strates, and not only in the teaching field."'37 This stigma was a result of the
court's conclusion that Lombard's dismissal was based on the finding that
Lombard was mentally unfit to teach. 38 The court relied on Board of Regents
v. Roth39 in stating-
[W]here the appellant's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake" or "the
State, in declining to re-employ [the respondent], imposed on him a stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment oppor-
tunities,"... he may claim a deprivation of "liberty" under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.40
On this basis, the court concluded that a full hearing, including the confronta-
tion of adverse witnesses, was required. The case was remanded for a trial to
determine whether or not Lombard's constitutional rights had been
violated. 41
By rejecting a mechanical application of res judicata principles in favor of a
balancing test, the court in Lombard adopted a salutary approach towards
reconciling the interests of litigants to the problems inherent in dual ad-
judicatory systems possessing concurrent jurisdiction. But the result the court
reaches is weakened for several reasons. First, even for those section 1983
cases where procedural due process claims do in fact raise "fundamental"
issues, there is no authority supporting the assertion that these claims merit
special consideration denied to other equally "fundamental" claims. 4 2 Second,
broad statements to the effect that plaintiffs need only withhold their federal
claims in state courts to be assured of a federal forum in a subsequent section
1983 action4 3 are contrary to the great weight of authority and tend to
36. 502 F.2d at 637. The court cited Canty v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973) (probationary teacher not entitled to full due process hearing);
see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972).
37. 502 F.2d. at 637. But see note 38 infra.
38. The committee which recommended the plaintiffs dismissal based its decision on his
allegedly illogical and disconnected conversation, and the findings of the employer's medical
department. 502 F.2d at 634. Yet, there were four other charges made against Lombard, any of
which would have been grounds for his dismissal. Id. Thus, the stigma resulting from his
discharge is not at all clear, particularly since he was found not to be disabled by HEW.
Id.
39. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
40. 502 F.2d at 637 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 638.
42. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
43. "To apply res judicata to a remedy which 'need not be first sought and refused' in the
state court, and which actually was not sought would be to overrule the essence of Monroe v.
Pape and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 ... (1939)." 502 F.2d at 635. "Nor is the plaintiff
19741
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weaken the precedential value of the opinion. 44 Finally, the court's decision,
avowedly preserving the plaintiff's right to choose a federal forum for his
federal claims, did not consider the fact that plaintiff did exercise his choice
by choosing the state court in the first instance.
William Goodwin
Criminal Law-Involuntary Confessions-Threatened Loss of Private
Economic Benefits Can Be Sufficient Coercion to Render Confession
Involuntary.-After extensive questioning by the police concerning his pos-
sible involvement in a murder, petitioner was released due to insufficient
evidence. Two months later, petitioner submitted to a polygraph examination
in connection with an application to secure employment with a private
company, during which he admitted that he had withheld information from
the police concerning the murder. The company interrogator immediately
informed the police who suggested that petitioner be given another polygraph
examination which they would monitor. Petitioner submitted to the second
examination after only two days on the job, on the company interrogator's
representation that the second test was necessary in order to qualify for the
position. Upon careful questioning, he admitted complicity in the murder and
was arrested by the police who had taped the conversation. He pleaded guilty
in state court to a reduced charge of first degree assault and was sentenced to
serve five to ten years in prison. Upon petition to federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner argued that the manner of interrogation
which resulted in his admissions was in violation of his fifth amendment right
to remain silent. The District Court for the Western District of New York
denied the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
economic coercion imposed by a private employer may result in testimony
inadmissible because of the fifth amendment prohibition against involuntary
confessions. The court affirmed the district court's denial, however, finding
that petitioner's claim of threatened loss of his laborer's job did not allege a
sufficiently substantial economic hardship to constitute economic coercion.'
required to make the attack ... in the state court, for section 1983 gives him an independent
supplementary cause of action, and he may choose the federal court as the preferred forum for the
assertion of constitutional claims of violation of due process." Id. at 636.
44. See note 16 supra. Another problem, not discussed in this Case Note nor by the court, is
the applicability, if any, of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (district court lacks
jurisdiction to review state court determinations on constitutional questions). The Rooker
doctrine has been applied to § 1983 claims (See Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 142 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974), but there, the constitutional issue clearly was
litigated in the state court action.).
1. The court also rejected petitioner's claim that the failure of the police to administer
Miranda warnings rendered his confession inadmissible, finding that petitioner was not in police
custody at the time of the second interrogation. United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500
F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-5183, U.S., Aug. 14, 1974. In
[Vol. 43
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United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, No. 74-5183, U.S., Aug. 14, 1974.
The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause2 protects an individual
from being compelled to give information in a criminal case which is either
directly self-incriminatory or "'which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute' " him.3 In modern practice the right has been
extended to all types of proceedings in which answers elicited from an accused
later may be used against him in a criminal proceeding, 4 and there is general
agreement that, for this reason, the principle transcends the narrow focus first
attributed to it in England and in the American colonies.5 The Supreme
Court has defined the prime policy considerations 6 in determining proper
addition, petitioner claimed that the transmission of his conversation with the interrogator to the
police violated his fourth amendment rights. The court also rejected this claim because there was
no trespass and the statements were made voluntarily without any "constitutional expectation of
privacy." Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)).
2. U.S. Const. amend. V provides in part: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... "
3. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,
486 (1951); see United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (codefendant in
narcotics case correctly asserted privilege since there was danger that his testimony under
cross-examination might provide clues to other illegal transactions). But cf. Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (exchange of use immunity for otherwise privileged testimony
held sufficient to compel relinquishment of fifth amendment right). While in theory the granting
of use immunity prohibits testimony from being used to furnish the link needed to prosecute, it
may not, in fact, accomplish this goal. See Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Testimony- Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 Vill. L. Rev. 470, 477-85 (1974); 25
U. Fla. L. Rev. 394, 399-400 (1973); 48 Wash. L. Rev. 711, 719-24 (1973).
4. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
5. McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193, 194-95
[hereinafter cited as McKay]. For discussion of the Anglo-American background of the privilege
against self-incrimination and its successor, the right to remain silent, see C. McCormick,
Evidence § 114 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2250
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel; Morgan, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1-23 (1949); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 788-89
(1935). "[B]y 1967 the Supreme Court had held that the privilege means at least the following. In
criminal proceedings the accused is protected from the time the inquiry 'has begun to focus on a
particular suspect,' through 'custodial interrogation,' and during the trial at which, even though
the defendant may decline to take the stand, the prosecution may not comment on his silence."
McKay 195 (footnotes omitted).
6. There is disagreement regarding the policies underlying the privilege because its
ramifications depend upon the factual context in which it is invoked. See McCormick § 118, at
253-54; Wigmore § 2251. Wigmore sets forth twelve policy considerations but narrows them to
those considered in notes 8-10 infra and accompanying text. Id. at 310-18. See generally Ellis,
Vox Populi v. Suprema Lex: A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth Amendment,
55 Iowa L. Rev. 829 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Ellis]; Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 671 (1968) (hereinafter cited
as Friendly]; McKay 206-14; 58 Calif. L. Rev. 988, 993 (1970).
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application of the fifth to include protecting an individual's privacy, 7 insuring
that the prosecution independently acquire evidence to meet its burden of
proof, 8 fostering a basic respect for all defendants in the administration of
justice9 and maintaining the integrity and dignity of the judicial process.' 0
Traditionally, the privilege has been balanced against the other public
interests."I Specifically, courts have attempted to protect the constitutional
rights of the citizen 12 without unduly hindering the police in their duty to
solve and deter crimes. 13
The early cases dealing with involuntary confessions dealt with the use of
overt physical force. 14 The Supreme Court has since extended the types of
coercion which are proscribed by the Constitution to include any type of
duress' s or deception' 6 that deprives an individual of his power to make a
completely voluntary decision to speak.
Most claims of coercion have involved police interrogations. These cases
may be divided into two categories depending on whether the court was
7. Bellis v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 2179, 2184-85 (1974); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 216 (1960);
McKay 210-14.
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964);
United States v. Wong, No. 74-1636, at 3-4 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1974); United States v. Wright,
489 F.2d 1181, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
591 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); see E. Griswold, The Fifth
Amendment Today 7-8 (1955); McCormick § 118.
10. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); see Michigan v. Tucker,
94 S. Ct. 2357, 2366 n.23 (1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); McKay
209-10.
11. Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2367 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 224-26 (1973); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1967); see Ellis 829, 856.
12. Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357,n2362 (1974); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
635 (1886); see United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1973); McKay 210-14.
13. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); see Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 587 (1961); Friendly 691.
14. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). While Brown's holding was based on due
process, subsequent holdings have made clear that the requirement of voluntary confessions is
derived from the privilege against self-incrimination. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). See also Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36
(1967) (police held guns to suspect's head and ordered him to confess).
15. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973) (consent to search must be voluntarily given and this is determined from
the totality of the circumstances).
16. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959); United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d
943 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), the Court stated: "There is
torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected by fear as by force. And there comes
a point when this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men." Id. at 52. In
United States ex rel. Everett v. Murphy, 329 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 967
(1964), Judge Smith stated: "A confession induced by police falsely promising assistance on a
charge far less serious than the police knew would actually be brought is not to be considered a
voluntary confession."
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concerned more with protecting the individual's rights or eliminating im-
proper or unscrupulous police practices. In dealing with the former concern,
courts have examined the subjective response of the person claiming that his
confession was coerced, giving particular attention to age, 17  ethnic
background,' 8 physical state, 19 mental competence,2 0 educational level, 2'
lack of prior experience with police procedures,2 2 and the presence or absence
of physical punishment. 23 "The significant fact about all of these decisions is
that none of them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling
criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding
circumstances. '24 Any number of these factors may be combined to show that
17. E.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52-55 (1962) (14 year old boy held incom-
municado for five days); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948) (15 year old boy questioned
by teams of police and held incommunicado for three days); see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Grant v. Wainwright, 496 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1974) (confession of black
murder suspect questioned extensively by relays of white policemen held involuntary). See also
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (confession of black chain gang escapee accused of
raping a white woman held involuntary).
19. . E.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520 (1968) (illness--high blood pressure
requiring medication twice a day; confession involuntary); see Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35,
36 (1967) (injury-suspect questioned while bullet was in his leg; confession invalid); Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 299-303 (1963) (medication-addict-suspect suffering from withdrawal
symptoms was drugged with injections of phenobarbital); United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d 943
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (intoxication-self-incriminating testimony of defendant made while
intoxicated but before he was taken into custody was admissible); United States v. Guaydacan,
470 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (medication-confession inadmissible when drugged
defendant had to be lifted from floor to get his attention for purpose of Miranda warnings).
20. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620 (1961) (confession of 33 year old
mental defective with low I.Q. and mental age held inadmissible); Fikes v. Alabama. 352 U.S.
191, 193 (1957) (confession of defendant who had completed only two years of schooling in eight
years held inadmissible); United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp. 1195, 1200-01 (D.D.C. 1973)
(defendant's mental deficiency considered as one factor for suppressing confession). See also
United States v. Stabler, 490 F.2d 345, 350-51 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant's mental competency
correctly considered as one factor, but trial court's finding of voluntariness held not to be
erroneous).
21. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (per curiam) (confession involun-
tary; suspect's low educational level held to be a factor); United States v. Blocker, 354 F. Supp.
1195, 1198-1200 (D.D.C. 1973) (same).
22. E.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 436-39 (1961) (suspect beaten by police while he
was sick and deprived of food; confession involuntary). See also United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 6 (1973).
24. Schneckloth v. Bustarnonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973); United States v. Clark, 499
F.2d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 1974) (confession held involuntary where defendant was questioned by
F.B.I. agents despite his statement that he would not speak without an attorney present); see
Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (after careful examination of the entire record petitioner's
confession was held to be involuntary). In Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 452-54 (1971), the
Court held that before it would examine the effect of individual factors on the voluntariness of a
confession, defendant would have to make a prima facie showing that his allegations, if true,
would compel a finding of coercion.
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coercion was present. 25
When a court is primarily concerned with discouraging improper methods
of law enforcement, as well as safeguarding individual rights, certain police
procedures have been held coercive without regard to the subjective charac-
teristics or responses of particular defendants.
26
Improper police practices are not the only methods 27 the state has used to
compel admissions or confessions. The courts have recognized that the state's
use of economic sanctions also may have coercive effects which render
involuntary a person's confession in violation of the fifth amendment. Cases
involving economic coercion may be divided into two separate, but overlap-
ping, categories: first, those dealing with public employees 28 or private
individuals in employment regulated or licensed by a public authority
29
threatened with job forfeiture for refusal to answer questions notwithstanding
their fifth amendment privilege; second, those concerning private individuals
or firms subjected to loss of public economic benefits-for example,
contracts-upon their invocation of the fifth amendment.
30
25. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Grant v. Wainwright, 496 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. Such procedures include unreasonable length of interrogation (Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 52-53 (1949) (five days of interrogation); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 221 (2d Cir.
1973)); holding suspect incommunicado (Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 347-48 (1968)
(defendant's attorney barred from contact with client); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504
(1963) (suspect refused permission to call wife or lawyer until he confessed); see Michigan v.
Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2366 (1974)); use of physical force (Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36
(1967); see United States v. White, 493 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1974)); use of pressure to change
suspect's story (Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967)); failure to inform suspect of his legal rights
(Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520 (1968) (per curiam); Randall v. Estelle, 492 F.2d
118, 120 (5th Cir. 1974)); keeping suspect in poor physical environment (Brooks v. Florida, 389
U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam) (prisoner kept in "sweatbox" without window or toilet for two
weeks)); and the use of deceptive promises and practices to obtain confession (Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556, 559-60 (suspect requested medical doctor but police provided psychiatrist who
induced the suspect to confess); United States ex rel. Everett v. Murphy, 329 F.2d 68, 69-70 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 967 (1964) (police told defendant that victim was all right and
promised help in return for a confession when victim actually was dead); see Holloway v. United
States, 495 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1974) (dictum) (trickery and cajolery would be sufficient to
invalidate a confession)).
27. For example, prison inmates have argued that it is a coercive practice for their testimony
before a parole board to be used against them in later proceedings. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487
F.2d 1280, 1289-90 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated & remanded, 94 S. Ct. 3200 (1974); Fowler v.
Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224, 1227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
28. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);
Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956
(1974); Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1973) (IRS employee); Kalkines v. United States,
473 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (U.S. Customs employee); Fitzgerald v. Cawley, 368 F. Supp. 677
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
29. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (lawyer); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)
(lawyer); Lurie v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel. Vining
v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973).
30. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (architects working on city projects); People v.
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The principal case dealing with economic coercion is Garrity v. New
Jersey,31 in which the state attempted to force police officers to testify
concerning the practice of fixing traffic tickets. A New Jersey statute32
provided that the officers could be dismissed for failure to answer. The
Supreme Court reversed the officers' convictions, holding that statements
compelled under threat of removal from office violated the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, noted the Court in the
broadest terms, this protection extended "to all, whether they are policemen
or other members of our body politic." 33
Spevack v. Klein,34 decided the same day as Garritv, extended the fifth
amendment privilege to lawyers in bar disciplinary proceedings. Justice
Douglas, speaking for the Court, concluded "that the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it
extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it
should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the
deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it."" A lower court has
extended the Court's reasoning by holding that exclusion from a field of public
employment may not be enforced simply because an individual refuses to
waive his fifth amendment right.3 6
In Gardner v. Broderick,37 the Court reaffirmed the holding in Garrity,
concerning the prohibition of the use of economic coercion to compel tes-
timony, but further stated that if the policeman had been granted immunity
from criminal prosecution the testimony validly could be compelled.3 8 The
most recent lower court cases concerned with economic coercion have fol-
lowed this approach. 39 It is not the loss of job that is crucial but whether the
threat of discharge was used to coerce a defendant to relinquish his fifth
amendment right.
The second line of cases that has made use of economic coercion an
unwarranted compulsion abridging the fifth amendment right has concerned
public contractors. In the leading case, Lefkowitz v. Turley,40 the Court held
that loss of state contracts as a penalty for invocation of the fifth amendment
Avant, 33 N.Y.2d 265, 307 N.E.2d 230, 352 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1973) (contractors engaged in snow
removal in Albany).
31. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
32. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965).
33. 385 U.S. at 500.
34. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
35. Id. at 514.
36. Raphael v. Conrad, 371 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D. Ind. 1974) (per curiam) tlobbyist denied
state certification).
37. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). In Gardner, the Court reversed a policeman's discharge for refusal to
sign a waiver of immunity respecting his grand jury testimony about performance of his official
duties.
38. Id. at 278.
39. Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891, 893 (7th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416
U.S. 956 (1974); Fitzgerald v. Cawley, 368 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.DXN.Y. 1973).
40. 414 U.S. 70 (1973). In Lefkowitz, architects were summoned to testify before a grand jury




constituted economic coercion, and affirmed the decision of the three judge
district court that New York's contractor-disqualification statute was invalid.
The district court had held that "disqualification from public contracting for
five years as a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege is violative of
... Fifth Amendment rights."'41 The Supreme Court further indicated that it
could see no "difference of constitutional magnitude between the threat of job
loss to an employee of the State, and a threat of loss of contracts to a
contractor. '42 To require a public employee to choose between his job or
contract and his right to remain sileRt interjects a factor which substantially
affects the voluntary nature of his election to give self-incriminatory tes-
timony. All citizens, including public employees or licensees, however, may
be compelled to testify in exchange for a grant of immunity;4 3 the government
may not expect more of public employees or licensees than private citizens in
regard to the relinquishment of the fifth amendment.
In United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye,4 4 the issue of economic
coercion in the area of purely private employment arose as one of first
impression. While Garrity, Gardner and Lefkowitz all dealt with public
employees, public contractors or public licensees, the language used in those
cases does not reflect a determination by the Supreme Court to restrict its
reasoning to loss of public benefits. In Garrity, the Court stated:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate them-
selves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of
self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That
practice ... is "likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from
making a free and rational choice."145
And in Gardner, the Court again spoke in universal rather than restrictive
terms: "In any event, the mandate of the great privilege against self-
incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate effec-
tiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of the loss
of employment. '4 6 The same recognition-that the essence of the issue is not
whether the economic coercion emanates from the state but whether the
economic coercion, induced by state action, 4 7 overcomes the free will of the
41. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 342 F. Supp. 544, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
42. 414 U.S. at 83.
43. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1968); People v. Avant, 33
N.Y.2d 265, 307 N.E.2d 230, 352 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1973).
44. 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, No. 74-5183, U.S., Aug. 14, 1974.
45. 385 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted).
46. 392 U.S. at 279.
47. When the company interrogator informed the police of his first conversation with
petitioner Sanney, he was acting on his own behalf as a public citizen. In conducting the second
polygraph examination at police request, however, he was acting on their behalf and, hence, as
an agent of the state. 500 F.2d at 413-14. The district attorney in the state court proceeding
conceded this fact and this established the existence of state action. Brief for Appellant at 4,
United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974). Despite the finding that
the state's agent was the interrogator, the Second Circuit held that Miranda warnings were not
required because petitioner was not "in custody" when interrogated, reasoning that he was free to
leave the company interrogator's office at any time. Id. at 416 (relying on United States v.
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accused-also seems apparent in Lefkowitz. 48
The holding of the court in Sanney accepts this principle. The court
admitted the possibility that, under the appropriate factual circumstances,
threatened loss of private employment would be found to have deprived a
criminal defendant of his free choice to confess or to remain silent. Judge
Mansfield, writing for the majority, stated:
Nor do we perceive any consequence flowing from the fact that the threat in the
present case was conveyed through a private employer, admittedly acting as an agent
for the police, rather than through a person on the public payroll. The state's
involvement is no less real for having been indirect and no less impermissible for
having been concealed. The state is prohibited in either event from compelling a
statement through economically coercive means, whether they are direct or indirect."9
In his dissent, Judge Feinberg agreed with the majority that the interrogation
of Sanney was characterized by government action and that the government
may not employ economic coercion to elicit incriminating statements." The
majority and minority in Sanney disagreed, however, as to whether the
specific loss threatened was of sufficient magnitude to raise the issue of
economic coercion as a matter of law.-"
The majority first applied a test of substantiality in deciding whether or not
private economic coercion would trigger the exclusionary rule barring the use
of coerced confessions.5 2 This test, in effect, would require the trial court to
decide whether the threatened loss to the accused is of the type that could
intimidate a defendant into relinquishing his right to remain silent rather than
face loss of his job.
A statement challenged on the ground that it was obtained as the result of economic
sanctions must be rejected as involuntary only where the pressure reasonably appears
to have been of sufficiently appreciable size and substance to deprive the accused of his
"free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer."" 3
Viviano, 437 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971) and United States v. Hall, 421
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970)). This view is consonant with that of
the majority of jurisdictions. See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What
Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L. Rev. 699, 709 (1974).
Having found that no Miranda warnings were necessary, the court was able to reach the issue
of economic coercion. If the court had held that the loss of petitioner's job was a substantial
coercive factor invalidating his confession, however, it seems that this same holding would have
required that petitioner be advised of his Miranda rights (see note 1 supra) in as much as the
threat of substantial economic loss presumably would have operated to deprive petitioner of his
freedom to leave the state agent's office, as well as his freedom to refuse to answer questions, and,
hence, petitioner would have been "in custody."
48. 414 U.S. 70 (1973). The Court stated" "[T]he State must recognize ... that answers
elicited upon the threat of the loss of employment are compelled and inadmissible in evidence."
Id. at 85.
49. 500 F.2d at 415.
50. Id. at 417 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 415; id. at 417 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 415.
53. Id. (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Noting that petitioner had been employed for only two days at the time of the
second interrogation, at which the damaging admissions were made, the
majority found that "the threat of discharge from a job as a driver's assistant
. . . can hardly be labelled a 'substantial economic sanction' rendering his
statement involuntary. '5 4 To this, Judge Feinberg vehemently dissented,
stating: "I reject both the notion that a menial job is somehow beneath
constitutional notice and the not unrelated idea that discharge from recently
begun employment must be an insubstantial loss."'55
To the extent that the losses involved in Garrity, Spevack and Lejklowitz
were more than discharge from a manual job with hourly wages, the
majority's factual distinction between those cases and Sanney is accurate.1 6
But in none of the prior cases did the Court enter into a discussion of the
financial means of the defendant or of the relative degree of economic
deprivation therein involved compared to that attendant upon other potential
job losses. In fact, the prior Court cases, indicated that the loss of the job and
accompanying benefits was sufficient, without more, to raise the inference
that defendant had been compelled to relinquish his voluntary choice to speak
or to remain silent.
Thus, from an apparently objective test set forth in the cases from which its
holding derived, the Sanney court formulated a partly objective and partly
subjective analysis which would require application of the rule on an ad hoc
basis. Sanney necessitates that consideration be given to the specific type of
coercion involved and the manner in which it was exercised, with particular
attention to the defendant's characteristics, such as age, ethnic background,
physical state, mental competence, educational level, prior experience with
police procedures, and the presence or absence of physical punishment.
57
54. Id.
55. Id. at 417 (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 415-16. A further factual distinction exists, inasmuch as the testimony in Garrity,
Spevack and Lefkowitz was sought in judicial proceedings while that in Sanney was sought in a
police investigation. The testimony in the former cases could have been compelled provided that
the defendants were granted immunity from criminal prosecution. Sanney was not questioned In
a judicial proceeding and, as such, the alternative protection afforded by a grant of immunity
was not available to him. See note 2 supra.
57. See notes 17-23 supra. In Sanney there is little discussion of these subjective characteris-
tics. The majority and minority opinions cite the opinions of the company interrogator regarding
petitioner's physical and mental state. Judge Mansfield interpreted a statement of the interrogator
that petitioner appeared to be " 'getting a sense of relief or release from having told me this,' " as
evidence of a will not overborne. 500 F.2d at 416. The dissenting judge indicated that the
interrogator's statements that petitioner " 'was worried about losing his job' " and was " 'kind
of completely crushed or emotional' " signified that Sanney's confession was not a product of a
completely free will. Id. at 417 (Feinberg, J., dissenting). Little weight can be accorded these
hearsay and opinion statements. Furthermore, petitioner's state of mind after the confession, as
opposed to that at the time of the confession, is unimportant. What is at issue is how the
confession was obtained. Judge Feinberg also concluded that petitioner was of marginal intelli-
gence and was emotionally troubled. Id. In'raising these considerations, Judge Feinberg permit-
ted himself to be drawn into the majority's formulation of a partly objective and partly subjective
test which must always be applied on an ad hoc basis.
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It is clear that the Sanney court was correct in limiting the use of private
economic coercion claims to situations in which the coercive effect is more
than minimal.5 8 But, at the time that a person has acquired a job commit-
ment, he has assured himself of the means of earning a livelihood, whether or
not that position carries with it fringe benefits in the form of a pension, a
license or an opportunity to engage in related activities for profit. Threatened
loss of that job certainly will mean more to some than to others, but it is
inappropriate for the court to say, as it did in Sanney, that threatened
deprivation of a job as a "transient manual laborer" cannot give rise to the
same inference of economic coercion which destroys voluntariness that loss of
a job as a policeman, sanitation worker, public contractor or attorney creates
under the objective test of the earlier cases.
Sanney extended the reasoning of the earlier cases into the area in which
the state is acting as the interrogator but not the dispenser of the economic
benefit involved. In view of the broad language of the earlier cases, and the
essence of voluntariness embodied in the fifth amendment, the extension is
both just and correct. But the burdens which the holding in Sanney imposes
upon a defendant who seeks to take advantage of the extension-establishing
that his loss was of sufficient magnitude and, in fact, did overcome his free
will-may prove insuperable in the ordinary case. In terms of judicial
administration, the issues to be determined by the trial court leave too great
an area for abuse by individual judges-to be tested only by the "clearly
erroneous" rule of appellate review of discretionary rulings-with too little
opportunity for the formulation of acceptable judicial guidelines. While some
authorities have stressed the overriding importance of the public interest in
solving crimes59 as a factor in setting rules for the application of the
safeguards of the fifth amendment, others have emphasized that, ultimately,
the "determination of the benefits which [society] feel[s] it is fair to accord the
defendant is affected by the costs imposed thereby upon society." '60
It is submitted that the cost imposed upon society in prohibiting the use in
criminal proceedings of confessions procured by private economic coercion is
minimal. 61 The concept that, under appropriate circumstances, economic
factors can subvert free will as much as physical punishment, has been clearly
propounded by the Court. Its extension to encompass those private acts which
are engaged in at the insistence of the police is supported in both law and
reason. What now is needed is a more objective and realistic test to determine
when a claimant has demonstrated that the threat to him was sufficient to
give rise to an inference that his confession or admission was coerced.
Howard Jusivig
58. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-83 (1973).
59. See generally Friendly 679-81.
60. Ellis 851.
61. Id. at 852-56.
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Federal Courts-Obligatory Appeals-Supreme Court Summary Dis-
position Upholding Lower Court Held Controlling in Second
Circuit.-Three teenaged girls brought a habeas corpus action in federal
court challenging their adjudication, pursuant to section 712(b) of the New
York Family Court Act, as Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS).' The
district court dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiffs had not
exhausted their state remedies. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the claim of unconstitutional vagueness was ripe for
federal adjudication, but ordered the lower court to dismiss on the merits.
The court of appeals found that the United States Supreme Court had upheld
the constitutionality of the New York statute when it summarily dismissed an
appeal taken from a New York Court of Appeals decision that had rejected
an identical constitutional claim. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666 (2d
Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974)
(No. 74-459).
Thus, the Second Circuit, for the second time in less than a month, 2
reaffirmed its rule that summary disposition of a case within the obligatory
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court3 is binding authority on lower courts. 4
"Summary disposition" as used in this Case Note is limited to the Court's
disposition of obligatory appeals upholding the lower court without plenary
consideration and without written opinion.5 In such cases, the Court will
1. " 'Person in need of supervision' means a male less than sixteen years of age and a female
less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school . . . or who is incorrigible,
ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful
authority." N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). The age distinction between
males and females has been held unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals. In re
Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972), discussed at text
accompanying notes 29-33 infra. Plaintiffs alleged that the statute was vague and overbroad, that
it punished a status, and that it violated their right to due process by depriving them of liberty
without serving any legitimate state purpose. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir.
1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 74-459).
2. See Doe v. Hodgson, 500 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1974), discussed at notes 53-56 infra and
accompanying text.
3. The Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction includes, inter alia, appeals taken from
decisions holding federal or state laws unconstitutional and from state court decisions that
challenged state laws do not violate the federal constitution. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2), 1257(1),
(2) (1970). When presented with such an appeal, the Court is without the discretionary power It
possesses to avoid deciding cases brought on petitions for certiorari. It can, however, reach a
decision without accepting briefs on the merits or permitting oral argument, by deciding the case
without opinion based on examination of the jurisdictional statement which must be filed with
each appeal (U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(2), 15). See R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice
§ 4.28 (4th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Stern & Gressman].
4. The Second Circuit had previously followed this rule in Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973), application pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) denied,
500 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1974); Heaney v. Allen, 425 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1970); Port Authority
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 387 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1967).
5. Other summary dispositions will not be treated herein. For example, the Supreme Court
may reverse an obligatory appeal summarily without plenary consideration. Stern & Gressman
§ 5.19. The Court occasionally disposes of an appeal without opinion after having allowed full
briefing and oral argument. E.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47
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simply "affirm" an appeal from a federal court or "dismiss for want of a
substantial federal question" an appeal from a state court. 6 The result is the
same in either instance: the decision below is left standing with no explana-
tion by the Supreme Court of the reasoning of its decision. However, when
the Court decides an obligatory appeal, even if without opinion, it reaches the
merits of the case. 7 Consequently, the question of precedential weight arises.
But before a lower court can grant precedential value, it faces the difficult
task of interpreting a holding without opinion.8
Because of the difficulties of interpreting any summary disposition and the
doubts that have been raised as to whether such holdings actually reflect
consideration of the merits, the question of their proper precedential value
becomes difficult to answer. 9 In its recent decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 1o
the Supreme Court may have opened the door to a resolution of the issue.
There the Court held that the eleventh amendment of the Constitution bars
the retroactive payment of benefits to one who has successfully challenged
the denial of grants under a state aid program supported by federal funds.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court had
previously summarily affirmed three district court decisions requiring such
retroactive payments." He said that
(1971). In addition, the Court sometimes summarily affirms or reverses the decision of a lower
court after having granted certiorari but without oral argument. See Stern & Gressman § 5. 12. In
the aforementioned instances, precedential considerations attach. A summary affirmance of the
decision of the inferior court by an equally divided Supreme Court (e.g., Radich v. New York,
401 U.S. 531 (1971)), allows the decision of the court below to stand, but denies it all precedential
value. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960) (separate opinion of Brennan, J h.
and cases cited therein; Stern & Gressman § 5.4. See generally Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam
Practice: A Critique, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 707 (1956). The Court will also dismiss obligatory appeals
without argument for a variety of jurisdictional and other reasons. Stem & Gressman §§ 5.20-.22.
6. The difference in terminology seems more apparent than real, and is accounted for by
history. See, e.g., Stern & Gressman § 5.6; Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A
Critique, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 707, 709-15 (1956); 68 Colum. L. Rev. 785 (1968).
7. "Votes to affirm summarily, and to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, it
hardly needs comment, are votes on the merits of a case . . . ." Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360
U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.); see Stem & Gressman § 4.28, at 197.
8. The problem of interpreting "opinions that do not opine" has been discussed in Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 3-4 (1957); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 98-101 (1959); cf. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1930, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 271, 281 (1931).
9. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 126-27 (1962); H.M. Hart & H. Wechsler,
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 574-76 (1953); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). See also M. Shapiro, Law
and Politics in the Supreme Court (1964); H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, in Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law 14 (1961); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1964); Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of
Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 373 (1972).
10. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
11. Id. at 670 n.13, citing Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972)
(mem.), affg unreported order and judgment of N.D. Ind. 1972, on remand from Carpenter v.
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summary affirmances . . . obviously . . . are not of the same precedential value as
would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits. 2
Both before and since Edelman, other circuits have held differing views of
the precedential value of Supreme Court summary adjudications, although
the rigid position of the Second Circuit generally is not followed. 13 In refusing
to be bound by a summary affirmance of a decision of a three-judge court
adverse to a petition identical to the one before it, the Ninth Circuit held,
prior to Edelman, that "[a] summary affirmance without opinion in a case
within the Supreme Court's obligatory appellate jurisdiction has very little
precedential significance.' 4 The Sixth Circuit cited Edelman in deciding that
a summary affirmance was not "controlling precedent" when it decided an
identical question contrary to the Supreme Court's disposition.' 5
Other circuits have not been willing to go so far. Seven years before
Edelman, the Fourth Circuit considered the merits of a case before deciding it
in accord with a summary disposition, declaring that, "we cannot disregard
[its] strong implications . *... ,,6 More recently, the Fifth Circuit decided a
case in accord with a summary disposition; citing Edelman, it described
Sterrett, 405 U.S. 971 (1972) (mem.); State Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S.
918 (1972) (mem.), affg 347 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49
(1970), aff'g per curiam Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
12. 415 U.S. at 671. The passage cited continues as follows: "[Tihese three summary
affirmances obviously are of precedential value in support of the contention that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar the relief. . . . Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedentlial
value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits .... Having now
had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and
argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the extent that they
are inconsistent with our holding today." Id. Although these words attribute some unspecified
quantity of precedential value to summary dispositions, they then take this little away by
implying that the merits may not be reached. Perhaps the passage is merely an acknowledgment
of the fact that "[pilenary consideration can change views strongly held, and on close, reflective
analysis precedents may appear inapplicable to varying fact situations." Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 360 U.S. 246, 248 (1959) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.); see note 57 infra. In his dissent
in Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655, 2685 n.27 (1974), however, Justice Marshall repeats
approvingly the portion of Edelman excerpted in the text accompanying this note.
13. The Seventh Circuit's formerly rigid position, Ahern v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363, 365 (7th
Cir. 1972) ("We agree with the Second Circuit," citing Port Authority Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 387 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1967)), may be undergoing a
change. It was its reliance on a summary disposition in reaching its holding in Jordan v. Weaver,
472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) that led it
to reach a result different from that reached by the Supreme Court after a full examination.
Recently, in United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir. 1974), the Seventh Circuit, id.
at 1397, quoted from the words of Edelman set out in text accompanying note 12 supra.
14. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972), citing Frankfurter & Landis,
The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1930).
15. Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 707-08 (6th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No. 74-403).
16. Wyley v. Warden, 372 F.2d 742, 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863 (1967); see
Joseph v. Blair, 482 F.2d 575, 579-80 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955 (1974).
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summary dispositions as "highly persuasive-if not controlling-authority,
which [it is] not free simply to disregard,"' 7 and added that they put the
Court's "imprimatur of approval on the result, if not on all the reasoning,
below." 1 8
In these situations, the Second Circuit looks at the decision below and at
the issues it believes were presented to the Court on appeal; the summary
disposition of a particular claim will be considered to have foreclosed a
similar claim presented to the Second Circuit.' 9 Often this procedure leads to
a correct result-the dismissal of a meritless claim. 20 On occasion, however,
the rigidity of the rule leads the Second Circuit to look for firm guidance
where only uncertainty exists. Although it is an extreme example of this,
Mercado v. Rockefeller 2' highlights the problems that generally arise.
In Mercado, the Second Circuit held that the petitioners' claim was
identical to the one involved in In re Negron.22 There, Tomasita Negron, a
fifteen-year-old girl, had been adjudged a PINS by the family court after a
fact-finding hearing and was ordered to spend up to eighteen months at the
New York Training School. This order was affirmed without opinion by both
the appellate division 23 and the New York Court of Appeals.2 4 Since the
constitutional attacks on the statute had been presented to, and presumably
rejected by, the New York Court of Appeals,25 Negron appealed as of right to
the United States Supreme Court.2 6 The Court dismissed the appeal,2 7 in
effect allowing the original determination of the family court to stand.2 8 With
no written opinion at any level, the Mercado court had to look elsewhere to
ascertain what the Supreme Court had decided in Negron.
The Second Circuit looked first to dictum in a case decided by the New
York Court of Appeals the same day it affirmed In re Tomasita N[egron, In
re Patricia A. 29 There, the New York court held that the age distinction
between males and females in the PINS statute30 was an unconstitutional
17. Rios v. Diliman, 499 F.2d 329, 334 n.8 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Id. at 334.
19. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
20. See Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 707, 709,
712-15 (1956).
21. 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 21,
1974) (No. 74-459).
22. 409 U.S. 1052 (mem.), dismissing appeal from In re Tomasita N., 30 N.Y.2d 927, 287
N.E.2d 377, 335 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1972), aff'g mem. 37 App. Div. 2d 698, 322 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Ist
Dep't 1971) (mem.).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. See the jurisdictional summary given in 30 N.Y.2d at 928, 287 N.E.2d at 377-78, 335
N.Y.S.2d at 683-84.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970).
27. 409 U.S. 1052 (1972) (nem.).
28. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
29. 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972) (noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev.
703 (1973)).
30. See note 1 supra.
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violation of equal protection. The court also referred to the claim in Patricia
A. of unconstitutional vagueness, pointing out that Negron had made the
same constitutional attack in her "companion appeal,"'3' and concluded that
the terms of the statute, "habitual truant, '32 "incorrigible," "ungovernable,"
"habitually disobedient," and beyond "lawful control," were sufficiently
definite. 33
The Mercado court next turned to a later decision of the New York Court
of Appeals, In re Ellery C. 34 There the court held that PINS may not be
placed in institutions where juvenile delinquents are confined. It said that
Negron was not authority to the contrary, because that case did not treat the
issue of the validity of Negron's confinement order since she had already been
released. 35 Ellery C. limited and explained Negron as "[h]aving decided that
the PINS statute was not subject to successful constitutional attack on due
process grounds .... ,,36
Therefore, only after examining dicta in the New York decisions in
Patricia A. and Ellery C. could the Mercado court conclude that the New
York Court of Appeals in Negron had upheld the PINS statute against the
same constitutional attack of vagueness made in Mercado.3 7 It considered the
"dictum" in Patricia A. to be the "holding" of Negron.38 Although Patricia A.
did address the vagueness question, Ellery C. spoke only generally of a "due
process attack" in Negron. In any event, neither case was decided on the issue
of vagueness and neither was controlling in Mercado, since only Negron
reached the Supreme Court. Moreover, Ellery C. certainly did not influence
the Supreme Court in Negron, since Ellery C. was decided a year after
Negron.
If the Supreme Court's disposition was an adoption of the New York
holding, then ascertaining that holding was important to the Mercado court.
Although it is reasonable to conclude that the New York court did decide
Negron on the issue of vagueness, it is impossible to be certain in the absence
of an opinion. 39 The district court in Mercado believed that "uncertainty" and
"substantial doubt"40 existed on the question of whether New York had
decided the vagueness issue in Negron. This is why it dismissed the complaint
and said that the Mercado plaintiffs had not exhausted their state remedies. 4'
31. 31 N.Y.2d at 85, 286 N.E.2d at 433, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
32. The wording of the statuute has since been amended to substitute the words "does not
attend school in accord with the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education
law .... ." N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). See also note 1 supra.
33. 31 N.Y.2d at 87, 286 N.E.2d at 434, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 35-36.
34. 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
35. Id. at 592, 300 N.E.2d at 425-26, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
36. Id. at 592, 300 N.E.2d at 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
37. 502 F.2d at 672.
38. Id. at 670.
39. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
40. 363 F. Supp. 489, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for
cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1974) (No. 74-459).
41. "But the existence of... other claims, when coupled with the substantial doubt that on
[Vol. 43
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Believing that it had determined the holding of the New York Court of
Appeals in Negron, however, the Second Circuit in Mercado next examined
the issues presented by Negron to the United States Supreme Court.4 2
Recognizing that summary dispositions are " 'somewhat opaque,'- 43 and
require careful analysis to discover what issues were actually before the
Court, it noted that the void for vagueness issue was among those in Negron's
jurisdictional statement.44 Concluding after lengthy discussion that the
vagueness claim had been properly presented for review to the Supreme
Court, the Mercado court was
satisfied that the summary dismissal of the appeal was dispositive of appellant
Negron's claim, the claim which has been rejected by the New York Court of Appeals,
that the statute was too vague to be constitutional.45
After declaring itself "bound by that holding," 46 the Second Circuit found the
vagueness claim of the Mercado plaintiffs to be meritless.
Mercado went to great lengths to interpret the meaning of Negron. Yet no
decision without opinion is "an adequate guide to bench and bar." 47 Certainly
jurisdictional statements tell what was presented to the Supreme Court, but
they do not reveal what the Court itself considered and which factors it found
dispositive. 48 It has been noted that the summary procedure itself "necessarily
entails risks of imperfect presentation" 49 of a case to the Court because the
traditional safeguards of" 'plenary briefs, oral argument and decision accom-
panied by reasons' "0 are lacking. In addition, the Court's enormous
caseload l has raised questions as to whether the Court actually decides all
the allegedly 'exhausted' point [i.e. vagueness] 'a further state proceeding would be unavailing,'
... makes this an unsuitable case for holding that the state courts may be bypass d for 'futility.'"
Id. (citation omitted).
42. 502 F.2d at 672.
43. Id. at 673, quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973). Gibson referred to a
summary disposition containing citations to two cases. Id.
44. 502 F.2d at 673; see Brief for Plaintiffs at 54-56, Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 F. Supp.
489 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3527 (U.S. Oct 21, 1974) (No. 74-459). The court decided that the fact that Tomasita Negron
had pleaded guilty below and might have failed to raise constitutional daims at the family court
hearing did not operate to waive these claims at the appellate level. 502 F.2d at 671-72.
45. 502 F.2d at 673.
46. Id.
47. Ulman & Spears, "Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question:" A Study in the
Practice of the Supreme Court in Deciding Appeals from State Courts, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 501, 530
(1940).
48. "One difficulty of appraisal arises out of the very nature of the summary opinion. Since
the Court's reasoning processes are not fully set forth, the observing critic can never be wholly
confident that he has taken into account all possible reasons for the Court's choice of a summary
statement." Sacks, The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, Foreword, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 99-100
(1954).
49. Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A Critique, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 707, 718 (1956).
50. Id., quoting Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1937 and
1938, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 601 (1940).
51. During the 1943 term, 1,118 cases were on the Supreme Court's docket; in the 1953 term,
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appeals (i.e. reaches the merits), or whether it sometimes uses discretion to
avoid decision, acting in much the same way that it does when denying a
petition for certiorari.5 2 The case of Tomasita Negron, with no opinion below
and a variety of peripheral issues, would seem to be the kind of case that the
Court might wish to avoid.
Although the Second Circuit clearly refuses to change its rule with respect to
summary dispositions, it has expressed dissatisfaction with the consequences
of such adherence. In Doe v. Hodgson sa the court reluctantly considered
itself bound by a summary disposition of the Supreme Court, later admitting
that if it did not feel so bound it would have decided the case differently.
5 4
This blind adherence to the rule seems particularly unjustifiable in Doe,
which appears easily distinguishable from the summary disposition by which
it felt bound.-s Addressing itself to the passage on summary affirmances in
Edelman, the court of appeals declared, however:
At most, it seems to suggest that the Court itself would feel less bound by principles of
stare decisis in dealing with issues already decided by a summary affirmance, But we
continue to believe that the privilege of disregarding even summary Supreme Court
holdings rests with that court alone.
5 6
1,453; and in the 1963 term, 2,768. Federal Judicial Center, Report of the Study Group on the
Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573, 613 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Study Group]. In
the 1973 term, 5,079 cases were on the docket. Review of the Supreme Court's Work: Statistics,
43 U.S.L.W. 3085, 3086 (U.S. 1974). Of the 3,876 cases disposed of during the 1973 term, only
161 were accompanied by full opinions. Id.
52. The influence of discretion on the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction was first
discussed in Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929,
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 12-14 (1930) ("The play of discretion is inevitable, and ... the pressure of
[the] docket is bound to sway its exercise. . . . [T]he administration of Rule [15] operates to
subject the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to discretionary considerations not unlike those
governing certiorari.') (italics omitted). See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, 126-27
(1962); Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L.
Rev. 40, 46-47 (1961). "It has often been observed that the dismissal of an appeal, technically an
adjudication of the merits, is in practice often the substantial equivalent of a denial of certiorari."
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 74
n.365 (1964).
53. 478 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973), application pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) denied, 500 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1974). In this case, the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's determination that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Romero v.
Hodgson, 403 U.S. 901 (1971), aff'g mem. 319 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1970), bound it to
dismiss an attack in Doe by migrant workers on federal and state statutes that operated to
exclude them from the benefits of social welfare legislation. "Were we writing on a clean slate, we
would take very seriously the assertion that on these facts the statutory exclusions cannot be
sustained. But given Romero, the slate is not clean; plaintiffs must obtain any further writings on
it in this case from the Supreme Court." 478 F.2d at 540 (italics omitted).
54. Doe v. Hodgson, 500 F.2d 1206, 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. The Romero case involved only the plaintiff's exclusion from unemployment compensa-
tion (319 F. Supp. at 1201), while Doe concerned a broad attack on all features of social
legislation (478 F.2d at 538-40). The Doe migrants also raised the question of whether their
exclusion amounted to a suspect classification, which should be judged by the strict scrutiny
standard (478 F.2d at 540), an issue not considered by Romero.
56. 500 F.2d at 1207-08.
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The questionable validity of the Second Circuit approach as illustrated by
Mercado and the divergence of views among the circuits suggest the need for
some guidelines either from the Court or from Congress. A solution is
available in the recommendation of the Report of the Study Group on the
Caseload of the Supreme Court for the abolition of the Court's obligatory
jurisdiction.5 7 Requiring all cases to be brought on certiorari would allow the
Court to leave standing the decisions of a lower court merely by denying the
petition for certiorari. This would be, in effect, an "affirmance" as are
summary dispositions now, s8 but no precedential effect would attach.59 It is
doubtful that this would measurably increase the volume of cases brought to
the Supreme Court. The uncertainties of the precedential value properly to be
given such dispositions and the difficulties of divining their meaning currently
encourage litigants to pursue their cases in hopes of persuading the Court that
their issues and facts are distinguishable and, hence, not foreclosed by the
effect of the obscure Supreme Court summary disposition.
60
Whether or not Congress acts on the proposals of the Study Group, it is
time for the Second Circuit to re-evaluate the viability of its rule. The
dissatisfaction it expressed in Doe, the difficulties it encountered in determin-
ing the holding of Negron, the questions raised by Justice Rehnquist's
language in Edelman, and the fact that other circuits are reconsidering their
positions, all make such re-evaluation appropriate. 6 1 These other circuits
have been willing, both before and after Edelnan, to deny binding authority
to a Supreme Court summary disposition, the meaning of which can never be
57. Study Group 595-605, 611-12. Justice Brennan has expressed strong support of this
proposition, noting that appeals consume a disproportionate amount of the Court's time. "Since
the policy considerations that gave rise to the distinction between review by appeal and review by
writ of certiorari have long since lost their force, I support most enthusiastically the proposal to
abandon the appellate jurisdiction and leave a writ of certiorari as the only means of obtaining
review by the Supreme Court." Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another DLsent, 40 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 473, 474 (1973).
58. See text accompanying note 7 supra; Note, Impact of the Supreme Court's Summary
Disposition Practice on its Appeals Jurisdiction, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 952 (1974).
59.- "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case, as the bar has been told many times." United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923); see
the separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter with respect to the denial of certiorari in Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950); Stern & Gressman § 5,7.
60. "To earnest litigants, orders without reasons entered without plenary hearing do not carry
the same conviction as a reasoned opinion." Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the
October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 605 (1940). The fact that the Supreme
Court subsequently has reversed the apparent holdings of certain summary dispositions also
encourages litigants to approach the Court. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(compelling retroactive payment of state benefits violates the eleventh amendment, although this
practice had been summarily upheld in the cases cited at note 45 supra); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence requirements for voting held invalid after having been
summarily upheld in Drueding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125 (1965), aff'g 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. ,Md.
1964)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (unconstitutionality of state miscegenation law
previously upheld summarily in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)).
61. See generally Study Group 595-605, 611-12.
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known with certainty. It appears, however, that the Second Circuit will




Securities-Possible Antitrust Violation Held Insufficient to Warrant
Injunction Against Tender Offeror or Duty of Disclosure to Target
Shareholders-Missouri Portland Cement Company (MP), the country's
twentieth largest cement producer, sold portland cement throughout eleven
states. Cargill, Inc., a large, privately held company engaged in a variety of
bulk commodity businesses, established the "Salt Group" to study prospects
for entry into the cement business. The Salt Group recommended a tender
offer or purchase of an established company. Cargill approached the man-
agement of MP with an offer to acquire the company. Upon MP's rejection,
Cargill announced a cash tender offer to purchase all of the outstanding
shares of MP common in order to acquire control of MP and either operate it
as a subsidiary or merge it with Cargill.
Two days later, MP filed suit in district court under section 16 of the
Clayton Act, ' seeking an injunction against the Cargill tender offer. MP's suit
was based on two separate claims: that Cargill's acquisition of MP would
violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 and that Cargill had violated section
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 by misrepresentations and
nondisclosure of material facts to MP stockholders. 4 Counterclaims by Cargill
62. Port Authority Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Authority, 387 F.2d 259,
262-63 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967).
1. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides for injunctive relief against
threatened loss due to antitrust violations.
2. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) provides in part:
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly."
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970) provides in part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any
such offer, request, or invitation."
MP also alleged violations of § 14(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970) (unlawful
to make tender offer for more than 5% of any class of equity security without specified disclosures
to shareholders and the SEC), which will not be discussed in this Case Note.
4. These were: "(1) Cargill had not sufficiently disclosed its financial condition; (2) it had
offered to supply financial information privately to some MP stockholders; (3) it misrepresented
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alleged that MP had misrepresented material facts in its public pronounce-
ments opposing the tender offer.5 The district court held that MP had raised
"serious antitrust issues [necessitating] further investigation,"' 6 but rejected all
seven of MP's securities law violation claims. 7 A temporary injunction was
issued pending trial of the antitrust questions.8 On appeal, the Second Circuit
concluded that MP had failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the
merits of its section 7 claim. 9 As a result, the temporary injunction was
that it did not intend to change the business; (4) it misrepresented to MP's management that it
would not make a tender offer; (5) it failed to disclose the means of financing the tender offer, (6)
it failed to disclose its own belief that MP shares were worth substantially more than the $30
offered, and (7) it failed to disclose that its acquisition of MP would violate § 7 of the Clayton
Act." Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 871 n.42 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 150 (1974). Only the last-mentioned claim will be discussed here. For
discussions of the general problem of disclosure to tender offerees, see Binder, The Securities Law
of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569, 611-25 (1973); Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus.
Law. 1091, 1110-14 (1968); Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Take-Over
Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. Law. 19 (1968).
5. 498 F.2d at 873-74.
6. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249, 263 (S.D.N.Y.). aff'd in
part, rev'd in part & remanded, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3190
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1974). The court of appeals ordered an expedited appeal because Cargill already
had acquired approximately 19% of the total outstanding shares of MP at a cost of more than
$8,000,000. 498 F.2d at 855.
7. 375 F. Supp. at 267-68. The court of appeals sustained this ruling on all seven Williams
Act claims. 498 F.2d at 875. However, on the counterclaims, the district court sustained one of
Cargill's securities law claims, viz., that MP made a material misrepresentation when it implied
that its shareholders would not be able to take advantage of an improved offer by Cargill, and
enjoined MP from making further public pronouncements without the consent of Cargill or the
approval of the court. 375 F. Supp. at 269-70. The court of appeals affirmed as to liability but
reversed the issuance of the injunction as too severe a remedy. 498 F.2d at 875.
8. 375 F. Supp. at 270.
9. In examining the anticompetitive effect of the tender offer, the courts first must define the
contours of the market which will be affected. The issue of the relevant geographic market was
not raised by Cargill on appeal to the Second Circuit. 498 F.2d at 858 n. 10. The district court
found that four metropolitan areas (St. Louis, Kansas City, Memphis, and Omaha) constituted
the relevant geographic market. 375 F. Supp. at 253. That court rejected Cargill's argument that
the proper geographic market for portland cement in this case was the eleven-state area in which
MP sold cement. Id. The court of appeals accepted the district court's finding for the purposes of
the appeal, but instructed the district court to give careful consideration on remand to the issue of
whether metropolitan areas are proper geographic markets for portland cement. 498 F.2d at 858
n.10. In questioning the district court's determination of relevant market, the Second Circuit
relied upon United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970), which approved the
FTC's finding that the relevant geographic market for portland cement was regional while the
proper market for ready-mix concrete was metropolitan. It does not seem probable in the present
case that an examination of the eleven-state area will produce a result different from that reached
by the district court after examination of the four metropolitan areas, since, as the court of
appeals pointed out, competition in both areas is limited to a few large producers, including
Missouri Portland. 498 F.2d at 855-56, 858 n.10. See generally United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2856 (1974); United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 94 S. Ct.
2788 (1974); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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lifted' ° and the tender offer was permitted to resume. The court further
concluded that in light of the improbability of a section 7 violation, Cargill
was under no section 14(e) duty to disclose possible antitrust problems to MP
shareholders. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 150 (1974). 11
Examination of Cargill's tender offer embroiled the Second Circuit in two
section 7 theories of anticompetitive effect, namely potential competition and
entrenchment. 12 The Supreme Court in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
Co.' 3 had formulated the potential competition theory as a guideline for
10. 498 F.2d at 872-73. The Second Circuit's standard for determining issuance of a
preliminary injunction against the continuance of a tender offer was set forth in Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), as "a clear showing of either
(1) probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief." Id. at 250 (emphasis
deleted). MP claimed that "even if the [section 7] analysis is sound, the district judge nevertheless
acted properly in issuing the injunction .... ".498 F.2d at 866. The court rejected MP's
contention. Id. at 867-70.
11. 498 F.2d at 866. The case was remanded for the framing of a temporary injunction
allowing the "resumption of the [tender] offer pending final determination of the antitrust issues
under terms and conditions consistent with [the court's] opinion." Id. at 875. The day following
MP's petition for certiorari, Mr. Justice Douglas granted a stay of the Second Circuit's mandate,
effectively reinstating the district court's injunction of the tender offer. Two weeks later, the full
Court vacated the stay over Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent. 94 S. Ct. 3210 (1974).
12. The potential competition theory examines the present procompetitive effect of the
acquiring firm's presence at the edge of the market, and the loss of potential competition which
may occur if the firm enters the market by merger or acquisition instead of de novo. See notes
18-21 infra and accompanying text. The entrenchment theory considers whether the acquiring
firm's "deep pocket" of financial and other resources will have a disruptive effect upon
competition within the relevant market. See notes 21-30 infra and accompanying text. For
applications of the entrenchment theory, see United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 604
(6th Cir. 1970) (vertical acquisition of largest nonintegrated customer for portland cement by
largest supplier thereof violative of § 7 due to acquiring firm's ability to extend credit and
withstand temporary losses); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 938-39 (3d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968) (acquisition of steel wool pad producer by large producer and
distributor of packaged food would have disruptive effect on balanced duopoly in steel wool
market); Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 1965) (acquisition of a small
corporation with virtual monopoly by a large, diversified corporation held violative of § 7).
A related theory scrutinizes a large firm's "toehold acquisition" of a small plant or company and
the expansion of it in order to obtain a significant market share. See Fox, Toehold Acquisitions,
Potential Toehold Acquisitions and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 42 ABA Antitrust Section 573
(1973); Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 156 (1972). The court in Missouri Portland determined that no attractive toehold prospects
were available to Cargill. Thus this theory would not support a finding of probable illegality. 498
F.2d at 864-65.
13. 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964). Other Supreme Court cases interpreting § 7 were discussed by
the Missouri Portland court but were found factually inapposite. These included Ford Motor Co.
v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (vertical merger); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (geographic market extension merger); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (merger involving both horizontal and vertical aspects). For
1974] CASE NOTES
section 7 actions involving mergers or acquisitions between noncompetitors.
Penn-Olin was a unique situation in that two companies, neither of which
was interested in entering the sodium chlorate market as an individual
competitor, attempted to accomplish entry by a joint venture.14 The Court
held that section 7 applied to joint ventures as well as to mergers,' s and that
the joint venture could be viewed as anticompetitive because of the elimina-
tion of the procompetitive effect of the firm that would have been left on the
edge of the market had the other firm entered individually. 16 The Second
Circuit in Missouri Portland found that Penn-Olin required that a company
have a prior, permanent commitment to an industry in order to be a potential
competitor, which Cargill did not have to the cement industry.
17
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. ' 8 developed the potential competi-
tion theory more fully. The Court considered the effect upon potential
competition of a geographic market extension merger.' 9 Instead of entering
the New England market de novo, Falstaff, the nation's fourth largest beer
producer, sought to acquire the largest seller of beer in that market. The
Court remanded for the trial court to consider the elimination of potential
competition based on the loss of Falstaff's "edge of the market" position as a
possible de novo entrant. 20 The test became a two-fold inquiry: whether the
acquiring firm was a potential competitor, and, if so, whether it exerted a
beneficial influence on competition while on the edge of the market. 2'
overviews of § 7 analysis, see Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 Va.
L. Rev. 1667 (1967); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv.
L. Rev. 1313 (1965); Comment, A Survey of Antitrust Law in the Fifth Circuit, 11 Houston L.
Rev. 640 (1974); Note, Conglomerate Mergers, 45 Notre Dame Law. 698 (1970); 51 Marq. L.
Rev. 205 (1968).
The court also considered a recent Tenth Circuit case factually similar to Missouri Portland but
did not adopt that court's reasoning or result. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (conglomerate merger held violative of § 7).
For criticisms of the Kennecott decision, see Note, Antitrust Conglomerate Mergers and Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 33 Md. L. Rev. 96 (1973); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 858-61 (1974); 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 772 (1973).
14. 378 U.S. at 165-67.
15. Id. at 168.
16. Id. at 173-74.
17. "Penn-Olin provides little comfort to MP.... Cargill has no permanent commitment to
the cement industry of the sprt that both Pennsalt and Olin had to chemicals such as sodium
chlorate." 498 F.2d at 861.
18. 410 U.S. 526 (1973). For discussions of this case, see Note, United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.-Potential Competition Under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Albany L. Rev. 348
(1974); Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-
examined, 72 M ich. L. Rev. 837 (1974).
19. 410 U.S. at 532-33. Von Kalinowski defines this term as "a merger in which the
participating corporations sell the same products or are in similar businesses but in different
geographic areas." 16A von Kalinowski, Business Organizations: Antitrust Laws and Trade
Regulation § 17.01, at 17-3 (1971) [hereinafter cited by volume as von Kalinowski].
20. 410 U.S. at 537.
21. Id. at 534 n.13.
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Missouri Portland distinguished Falstaff on the apparent grounds that Car-
gill, unlike Falstaff, was neither in the cement industry at the time of the
tender offer, nor considered de novo entry feasible. Thus, concluded the
court, the cement industy could not reasonably fear Cargill's potential de
novo entry, and therefore Cargill did not exert a present procompetitive
influence.22
The Missouri Portland court also rejected MP's entrenchment argument.
The Supreme Court had developed this theory in FTC v. Procter & Gamble
Co. 23 to deal with a product extension merger. 24 Procter & Gamble, a large
diversified manufacturer of low-price household products, had acquired the
assets of the leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach, Clorox. This
acquisition involved the substitution of a powerful firm with substantial
advertising and marketing resources for a smaller firm dominant in its own
market. The Court held that the acquisition had a disruptive effect upon price
competition and raised the barriers to future entry-hence barriers to poten-
tial competition-in that industry. 25 The Second Circuit distinguished Procter
& Gamble on the basis of a finding of fact that there was "no close similarity
in products, customers, or marketing techniques" 2 6 between Cargill and MP.
As an alternative ground, the court attempted to show Procter & Gamble to
be a more dangerous "powerful acquiring firm" than Cargill. 27 This discus-
sion proceeded from the indisputable premise that "the 'entrenchment' theory
seems to require more than simply a showing that the acquiring firm has a
deep pocket."'28 In this light, the court termed the danger of Cargill's
22. 498 F.2d at 863.
23. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
24. Id. at 577-78. A product extension merger has been defined as "a merger in which tile
products of the acquired company are complementary to those of the acquiring company and may
be produced with similar facilities, marketed through the same channels and in the same manner,
and advertised by the same media." 16A von Kalinowski § 17.01, at 17-2 to 17-3. See generally
Note, The Use of Legal Presumptions in Implementing Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 17 Am.
U.L. Rev. 76 (1967); 51 Marq. L. Rev. 205 (1968); 42 St. John's L. Rev. 259 (1967).
25. "The major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is advertising.
Clorox was limited in this area by its relatively small budget and its inability to obtain substantial
discounts. By contrast, Procter's budget was much larger; and, although it would not devote its
entire budget to advertising Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term threat of
a new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts to advantage in advertising
Clorox. Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it
would have been to face the smaller Clorox." 386 U.S. at 579.
26. 498 F.2d at 862.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 865. Past decisions have given some indication of what factors besides deep pockets
are needed. Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 520 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928
(1973) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (increased costs of advertising and sales promotion for potential
competitors); United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 603-04 (6th Cir. 1970) (sheer size
and financial resources one element to be considered); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d
223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (size and financial resources of acquiring firm would enable it to
engage in price competition ruinous to much smaller competitors); Smith-Victor Corp. v.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (prior engagement in relevant
market taken into account).
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entrenchment "more metaphorical than real," 29 and concluded that there was
insufficient probability of a section 7 violation to meet the injunctive
standard.
30
It appears arguable that the Missouri Portland decision read the prior cases
with an eye on the policy implications of allowing a target company to utilize
the antitrust laws as part of its defensive arsenal.
Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard where it would doubtless have remained sheathed
in the face of a friendly offer, the target company typically hopes to obtain a
temporary injunction which may frustrate the acquisition since the offering company
may well decline the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time
could so change conditions that the offer will fail even if, after a full trial and appeal,
it should be determined that no antitrust violation has been shown. Such cases require
a balancing of public and private interests of various sorts."
To prevent use of the antitrust laws for this purpose, the court arguably will
treat such requests for a temporary injunction with a good deal of skepticism;
it will not, at least in this situation, apply section 7 in an expansive manner.
The Missouri Portland court's treatment of MP's entrenchment argument is
illustrative. That court's conclusion that Cargill possessed deep pockets and
nothing else must be read together with the Salt Group's conclusion that
much of Cargill's distribution, marketing and production experience in salt
could be applied to portland cement 32 In addition, Cargill believed that it
could utilize its considerable capacity for bulk commodity transportation to
secure competitive advantages in the portland cement market. 33 Thus, the
court arguably could have analogized to the "deep pocket plus" situations
presented by Procter & Gamble and other entrenchment cases.34 However,
the court apparently determined that such an approach would encourage
abusive use of the antitrust laws.
Having concluded that the standards for injunctive relief-probable success
on the merits and possible irreparable harm or serious issues going to the
merits accompanied by a likelihood of hardships upon the party seeking the
injunction35-- were not met, the court turned to the securities law issues.
Again, the court appeared reluctant to place obstacles in the way of the tender
offeror, and arguably concluded that its resolution of the request for injunc-
tive relief under the antitrust laws was dispositive of the issue of Cargill's
duty to disclose to MP investors that an antitrust issue existed. In cases such
as Missouri Portland, once a court has measured the possibility of a section 7
violation, it must then determine whether that quantum of possibility requires
disclosure under section 14(e) of " 'basic facts so that outsiders may draw
29. 498 F.2d at 865.
30. Id. at 865-66; see note 10 supra.
31. 498 F.2d at 854.
32. 375 F. Supp. at 256 n.2.
33. Cargill's transportation capacity is discussed at id. at 254. In its report to the Cargill
Board, the Salt Group noted that "[clement is a basic bulk commodity which would enable
Cargill to utilize its transportation expertise, both in relation to land and water." Id. at 256 n.2.
34. See notes 12, 23-28 supra and accompanying text
35. 498 F.2d at 866; cf. Broder v. Dane, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. S 94,875
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1974).
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upon their own evaluative experience [sic] in reaching their own investment
decisions .... ' ",36
The test of materiality to decide which "basic facts" must be disclosed has
been phrased by the Second Circuit as whether "any of the stockholders who
tendered their shares would probably not have tendered their shares"3 7 if the
fact in question had been disclosed. As stated in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp. :38
Account must be taken of all the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the
fact under consideration is of such significance that a reasonable investor would weigh
it in his decision whether or not to invest.3 9
Courts have previously considered the materiality of the possibility of an
antitrust violation. Perhaps the most important case in this area is Gulf &
Western Industries, Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 40 There, G&W,
a large, diversified conglomerate, made a cash tender offer to purchase 15
percent of the outstanding shares of A&P, one of the nation's largest retail
supermarket chains. A&P alleged that G&W's other holdings, as well as those
of one of its directors, were such that consummation of the tender offer would
violate section 7. 41 After holding that A&P had demonstrated sufficient
likelihood of success on its section 7 claim to justify a preliminary injunction
against continuance of the tender offer, 42 the court declared that "[iut . . .
appears that G&W omitted to state certain material facts indicating that there
36. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 1973),
quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). The legislative history makes clear that the purpose of this section was
protection of investors and that "[t]his provision would affirm the fact that persons engaged In
making or opposing tender offers or otherwise seeking to influence the decision of investors or the
outcome of the tender offer are under an obligation to make full disclosure of material
information to those with whom they deal." H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968).
See also H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). For discussion of the purposes
and judicial interpretations of the Williams Act, see Griffin & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public
Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How.
L.J. 654 (1971); Young, Judicial Enforcement of the Williams Amendments: The Need to
Separate the Questions of Violation and Relief, 27 Bus. Law. 391 (1972).
37. Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967); see
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d
Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (rule 10b-5); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (rule 10b-5). For a discussion of the similarity of the § 14(e)
materiality test to that under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), and rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1974), see Comment, Chris-Craft and Section 14(e): The Expansion of Lead
Underwriters' Liability, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 820, 826-27 (1974).
38. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
39. Id. at 363.
40. 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 689-91.
42. Id. at 695.
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are substantial antitrust obstacles to G&W's purchasing a large portion of
A&P's shares."'43 The court went on to hold that A&P had demonstrated a
"probability of success" on this claim under section 14(e):"
The facts that, at the time it announced its tender offer, an antitrust action had not
been commenced against G&W, and that its liability was uncertain, does not excuse
G&W's failure to disclose all . . . relevant circumstances so that A&P shareholders
could weigh them in reaching their decision whether or not to tender their shares ....
Those "basic facts" bearing upon G&W's possible liability for antitrust violations were
of obvious concern to those A&P shareholders who retained part of their holdings.'"
The disclosure of possible antitrust problems does not place a great burden
of speculation or prediction upon a tender offeror. In Elco Corp. v. Microdot
Inc.,4 6 which involved nondisclosure of possible violations of section 7 in
connection with a horizontal merger,47 the court stated:
At a minimum, the present record makes it appear that the facts . . . raised serious
and substantial questions about the legality of the transaction. If so, the), held the
potential of effecoing the judgment of Elco's stockholders on whether and how much to
tender. These basic facts could have been stated without speculation on future events.
They were not stated.48
The purpose of the Willams Act is full and fair disclosure.4 9 When it is
43. Id. at 697. These facts were that the chief executive of G&W owned a controlling interest
in Bohack, and that G&W owned several companies which were actual or potential suppliers of
A&P and planned to take advantage of its acquisition of A&P to expand those operations. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. This is consistent with earlier holdings under § 14(e) that prospective or conditional
events must be disclosed to tender offerees if the occurrence of the event would be a material fact.
"Where the event, if it should occur, could influence the stockholder's decision to tender, the
chance that it might well occur is a factor that should be disclosed to the investor .. ." Sonesta
Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1973) (nondisclosure, inter
alia, of the fact that consummation of the merger might cost target company its listing on the
New York Stock Exchange); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.. 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (nondisclosure of offeror's anticipated sale of asset at
substantial loss). Remarks in prior § 14(e) cases had given more comfort to tender offerors. See
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075, 1086 (5th Cir. 1970) (offeror "not
required to make predictions of future behavior. . . which may cause the offeree or the public
investor to rely on them unjustifiably."); cf. Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969).
46. 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973).
47. In Elco, Microdot, a manufacturer of metal plate connectors, made a tender offer to
acquire about 51% of the common stock of Elco Corporation, a competitor. Id. at 744-46.
48. Id. at 752-53. As in Gulf & Western, the Elco court concluded that there was sufficient
probability of success on the § 7 claim to justify a preliminary injunction on that basis alone. Id.
at 750-55; see notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text. The basic facts in Elco were that Elco
and Microdot were in direct competition in the metal plate connector market and in potential
competition for the sale of electronic connectors in other markets. 360 F. Supp. at 752.
49. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. See generally Brown, The Scope of the
Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. Law. 1637 (1971); Note, The Scope of Section
14(d): What Is A Tender Offer?, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 375, 379 (1973); 45 Tul. L. Rev. 195, 201
(1970).
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doubtful whether a fact is material, a tender offeror should always give the
shareholders the benefit of the information."0 The Missouri Portland district
court distinguished Gulf & Western5' and Elco5 2 on the basis of a finding in
those cases that the probability of an antitrust violation was "clearly apparent
at the time of the offer."'5 3 The Second Circuit adopted this "clearly apparent"
test.5 4
Even though the court in Gulf & Western had found a probability of
antitrust obstacles, that court nowhere indicated that such obstacles had to be
"clearly apparent" at the time of the tender offer. In fact, the court stated that
only "[those 'basic facts' bearing on G&W's possible liability for antitrust
violations"55 were of concern to shareholders and required disclosure. The
Missouri Portland court never reached the core of the "basic facts" issue, i.e.,
whether the possible liability for antitrust violations was a basic fact requiring
express disclosure.5 6 Instead, the court concentrated on the threshold question
of what quantum of probability would constitute a material fact under section
14(e).
Missouri Portland is a clear statement that the Second Circuit will permit a
tender offer to be retarded by its antitrust implications only in the egregious
case. On the one hand, the case can be viewed as a commendable recognition
that a temporary injunction is often fatal to a tender offer and should be
entered only when the target's antitrust objections are of significant merit. On
the other hand, only time will tell whether there is now one section 7 for
tender offers, and another, more onerous section 7 for other methods of
merger and acquisition. Since the Federal Trade Commission has challenged
50. "If there is a choice between the interests of the shareholder or the bidder, Congress has
already decreed that the interests of the shareholder must prevail." Binder, The Securities Law of
Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569, 635 (1973).
51. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); see
notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
52. Elco Corp. v. Microdot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973); see notes 46-48 supra and
accompanying text.
53. 375 F. Supp. at 268, quoted with approval in 498 F.2d at 872 n.44. The court did not
attempt to distinguish these cases on the basis that in both the probability of a § 7 violation was
held sufficient to warrant injunctive relief in its own right, apart from nondisclosure claims under
§ 14(e). Nor did the court discuss the question of whether a § 14(e) violation can occur despite
denial of injunctive relief on the § 7 claim. Apparently this result is possible insofar as the
"possibility" test of Gulf & Western seems less onerous than either substantive branch of the
Sonesta injunctive relief standard ("probability of success on the merits" or "sufficiently serious
questions constituting a fair ground for litigation"). Compare note 10 supra with notes 40-45
supra and accompanying text. However, the adoption in Missouri Portland of a "clearly
apparent" standard under § 14(e) may mean that a § 14(e) violation will not occur unless the
defendant has also violated § 7.
54. 498 F.2d at 872-73; see Comment, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little
Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991 (1973). The Missouri Portland court did concede that the
issuance of a complaint by the FTC should be disclosed. 498 F.2d at 873.
55. 476 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
56. See notes 40-48 supra and accompanying text.
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Cargill's attempted takeover of MP,5 7 it arguably follows that the Second
Circuit too readily disposed of MP's claims. Moreover, the court's willingness
to allow the tender offeror not to disclose the possibility of antitrust violations,
notwithstanding its own resolution of the request for injunctive relief under
section 7, appears ill-reasoned. The court correctly notes that the basis, if
any, of the antitrust violations were "known. . .to the target. .. [and] can
safely be left for the latter's riposte. 58 However, that basis was not necessar-
ily well-known to the holders of MP stock, and it is these investors whom
Congress desired to keep informed. To place the feet of the target in two
cement blocks may well create imbalances in the economy and injustice to the
individual investor.5 9
Claire V. Eagan
Securities-Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Private Right of Action
for Damages Allowed Against an Investment Adviser and His
Accountant.-Plaintiffs, limited partners of a partnership organized for the
purpose of investing in securities, brought suit against two general partners
and the partnership's outside accountants, seeking damages under, inter alia,
section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,1 alleging that the general
partners had engaged in fraudulent practices in the conduct of the business of
the partnership. On defendant's motion to dismiss, the court, noting that the
section 206 claim for damages raised a question of first impression, held that
that section could be the basis for a private right of action. Defendant
accountants, charged with aiding and abetting the dissemination of false and
misleading financial statements, moved for a rehearing, arguing that even if a
private cause of action exists under section 206, the specific language of the
section limits its applicability solely to investment advisers. The court dis-
agreed, and held that they could be held jointly liable with the investment
57. See Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1974, at 5, col. 1. MP was decided in June.
58. 498 F.2d at 873 (footnote omitted).
59. See generally SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11003 (Sept. 9, 1974).
1. Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970) provides in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails, or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly--(1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client. .. ." Section 206 of the Act refers only to transactions by "any investment adviser," a
term defined by § 202(a)(11). As defined, the term includes, with certain exceptions, "any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in,
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities .... " IS U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(11) (1970).
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advisers. Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp.
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The Investment Advisers Act of 19402 and the Investment Company Act of
19403 were the result of an extensive study and report by the SEC concerning
investment trusts, investment companies and investment advisers.4 Little was
known about the number or activities of investment advisers; in fact, one of
the primary purposes of the Advisers Act was to discover more about this
profession and its practices. 5 The SEC report and recommendations were
submitted to Congress, and a Senate committee draft proposed a licensing
requirement for all investment advisers, a prohibition against misrepresenta-
tion and fraudulent activities, and a grant of investigative powers to the
SEC. 6 During congressional hearings on the bill, the provision for investiga-
tive powers was criticized 7 and ultimately was deleted. In its final form, the
Act specifically defined several unlawful practices8 and included section 206, 9
which proscribed fraudulent practices in general terms. The primary tool of
enforcement was the injunction, which the SEC could obtain in federal
district court by showing violation of the Act. 10 Additionally, the SEC had
the power to revoke or suspend the registration of an investment adviser, but
only after an injunction had been issued or he had been found guilty of
certain crimes."' The Act remains the only major securities act which does
not provide a private right of action.' 2 Furthermore, section 206-unlike
other securities antifraud provisions-was not litigated extensively,' 3 and no
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
3. Id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52. The two acts are part of a single piece of legislation. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 constitute titles I and
II, respectively, of the Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789.
4. SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1939).
5. The SEC reported to Congress that, in connection with its study of investment advisers, it
had been unable to ascertain their number or the amount of funds under their control. S. Rep.
No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940). §§ 203-204, the registration and reporting provisions of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3, 4 (1970), were designed to elicit such information.
6. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 98-101 (1940).
7. See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 76 Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 718-19 (1940).
8. Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, 54 Stat. 852. See § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970)
(certain investment advisory contracts illegal); § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1970) (material
misstatements); § 208, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8 (1970) (unlawful representations).
9. Section 206, 54 Stat. 852, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
10. Section 209(e), 54 Stat. 854, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
11. Section 203(d), 54 Stat. 851, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1970).
12. Examples of specific provisions for civil liabilities include, e.g., §§ 11, 12 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970); § 323 of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www (1970); §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(e),
78p(b), 78r (1970); §§ 16(a), 17(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79p(a), 79q(b) (1970); and § 30(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-29(f) (1970).
13. In 1959, one commentator observed that since the promulgation of the Act in 1940, civil
and administrative proceedings under its provisions averaged only one or two per year. Loomis,
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cases recognized a private right of action under its provisions. 14 For this and
other reasons, the Act was widely criticized.' s
In 1960 Congress adopted proposals submitted by the SEC. 16 The SEC was
granted the power to suspend or revoke registrations upon finding that an
adviser had violated the Act 17 and was given extensive rulemaking authority
to declare specific activities to be fraudulent or deceptive practices. 18 Section
206 was extended to all investment advisers, whether registered or not, 19 and
the grounds for denial of registration were expanded significantly. 20 Despite
the fact that no provision for civil liability was included in the amendments,
the SEC remained convinced that private liability was important for effective
enforcement of the Act. As early as 1951, an opinion of the General Counsel
of the SEC2 1 stated that "the anti-fraud provisions of the SEC statutes are
violated by the employment of any legend, hedge clause or other provision
which is likely to lead an investor to believe that he has in any way waived
any right of action he nay have .... "22 Among other statutes, the opinion
referred specifically to section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act.2 3
In 1961, shortly after the effective date of the Advisers Act amendments, a
private action for damages under section 206 came before the Eighth Circuit
in Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc.2 4 Recognizing the dearth of express
provisions in either statute respecting private civil liability, the court con-
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 214, 248 (1959).
14. See 24 SEC Ann. Rep. 162 (1959).
15. E.g., Dean, Twenty-five Years of Federal Securities Regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 697, 705-06 (1959). Professor Loss has described the
Act as little more than a continuing census of investment advisers in the United States. 2 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1393 (2d ed. 1961). The SEC commented on its insufficient enforcement
powers in no uncertain terms: "Since, with its limited powers under the Act, the Commission can
only set the machinery of the law in operation after violations have been established, the Act
should not be relied on as a measure to prevent such fraudulent practices, except, of course, to
the extent that any law which provides criminal penalties may act in and of itself as a deterrent to
crime." 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 184 (1944).
16. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885. Section 216 of the Investment
Advisers Act provides that the SEC shall submit an annual report which shall include recom-
mendations for further legislation as it may find advisable. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-16 (1970).
17. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 2, 74 Stat. 885.
18. Id. § 9, 74 Stat. 887.
19. Id. §§ 8-9, "74 Stat. 887.
20. Id. § 3, 74 Stat. 885.
21. 16 Fed. Reg. 3387 (1951).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. The SEC previously had expressed the view that investment advisers were required to
serve the interests of their clients with undivided loyalty. 11 Fed. Reg. 10,997 (1945); see Hughes
v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Cases already had established a similar duty at common
law. E.g., Ridgely v. Keene, 134 App. Div. 647, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (2d Dep't 1909) (plaintiff
investment adviser could not recover on contract requiring him to influence his clients to
purchase stock in which defendant stockbrokers were interested).
24. 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962) (per curiam).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
cluded that no such liability could be implied as to investment company
directors. 25 However, the Brouk decision did not comport with the trend
toward implication of private remedies for securities violations 26 and the
Eighth Circuit later disapproved of the case in dictum. 27
Apart from an uninformative per curiam decision 28 in 1955, section 206
received its first extensive judicial treatment in SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc. 29 There, the SEC sought a preliminary injunction under
section 206 to prevent an investment adviser from engaging in "scalping, 3 0
or to require him to disclose the practice to his clients. The Court recognized a
fiduciary relationship between an investment adviser and his client, which
imposes on an adviser "an affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith, and full and
fair disclosure of all material facts,' as well as an affirmative obligation 'to
employ reasonable care to avoid misleading' his clients."'3 1 Reversing the
court of appeals, 32 the Court held that the securities laws do not require proof
of intent to injure in order to enjoin a practice which acts as a fraud or deceit,
noting that "Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be
construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes. "33
The cases cited 34 by the Capital Gains Court dealt with section 17(a) of the
25. Id. at 906. Section 30(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 does provide for private
civil liability in very limited circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1970).
26. See note 39 infra.
27. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 793 (8th Cir. 1967). Today it is widely
recognized that an implied private cause of action for a violation of the Investment Company Act
exists. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 815 (5th Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Taussig v. Wellington Fund Inc., 313 F.2d 472, 476 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1961).
28. Seipel v. SEC, 229 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (injunction against § 206
violations affirmed without discussion).
29. 375 U.S. 180 (1963), noted in 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 838 (1964); 42 N.C.L. Rev.
954 (1964); 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 135 (1964); 38 Tul. L. Rev. 778 (1964); 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 148
(1964).
30. "Scalping," in its simplest form, occurs when an investment adviser or other person
purchases a security, subsequently recommends its purchase to investors, and then sells in the
hope of realizing a short-run profit due to investor interest he has generated in the security. SEC,
Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 5, at
58 (1963).
31. 375 U.S. at 194 (footnotes omitted); see 19 U. Miami L. Rev. 148, 152 (1964).
32. 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (en bane),
rev'd & remanded, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
33. 375 U.S. at 195 (footnote omitted); see 37 S. Cal. L. Rev. 359, 366 (1964); 19 U. Miami L.
Rev. 148, 152 (1964). But see Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 410-13 (1962), where the Court
warned against excessive judicial expansion of the securities laws to accomplish objectives
believed to be beneficial. Essentially, this was the reasoning of the court of appeals in Capital
Gains. 306 F.2d at 609.
34. The Court cited Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (§ 10(b));
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (§§ 17(a) and 10(b)); Hughes v.
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Securities Act,3 5  section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 3 6 and rule 10b-5
thereunder, 37 rather than with section 206. Several commentators have
pointed out that section 206 was patterned after section 17(a) and have argued
that cases construing these provisions should be applied to section 206.38 This
would mean the implication of a private right of action under section 206. 3
9
During the 1960s, the SEC continued its attempts to establish civil liability
to injured investors for violations of section 206. In a special study 0 submit-
ted to Congress in 1963, the Commission recommended that the reckless or
false distribution of investment advice be subject to express civil liability.4 1
Subsequently, several private actions which included claims under section 206
came before the courts. However, each of these cases was decided on other
grounds, and the merits of the section 206 claims never were reached.42
Two later decisions may be construed as conferring a private cause of
action under section 206. In Courtland v. Walston & Co.,1 3 an investor
brought suit against the estate of a deceased registered representative, alleging
SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (same); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (§ 17(a)); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795 (8th Cir). cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943) (same); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd on
other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937) (same).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
36. Id. § 78j(b) (1970).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
38. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1515 (2d ed. 1961); 38 Tul. L. Rev. 778, 781 (1964); 71
Yale L.J. 1342, 1346 (1962); see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 752
(2d Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 306 F.2d 606 (1962) (en banc), rev'd & remanded, 375 U.S. 180
(1963).
39. While the Supreme Court has only recently held, in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), that a private action exists under § 10(b). lower courth
have long recognized the remedy. See notes 59-61 infra. Holding that a private cause of action
exists under § 17(a) are Fischman v. Raytheon fg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n.2 (2d Cir. 1951)
(dictum); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Dack v.
Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Contra, Hardy v.
Sanson, 356 F. Supp. 1034, 1038 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.
Supp. 890, 905 (D. Me. 1971). See also Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th
Cir. 1967); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
40. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
41. Id., pt. 5, at 60.
42. Kutner v. Gofen & Glossberg, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
93,109 (7th Cir. 1971) (unwise investment or mismanagement fails to constitute fraud under the
statute); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U S. 974
(1971) (shareholders of a mutual fund do not have a personal cause of action for damages
allegedly sustained by their corporation); Jones Memorial Trust v. Tsai Inv. Servs., Inc., 367 F.
Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (mismanagement of research and recommendation of investments did
not constitute fraud) (alternative holding); Skydell v. Mates, 59 F.R.D. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(denial of class action status); Schlusselberg v. Werly, 274 F. Supp. 758, 759-60 (S.D.N Y- 1967)
(jurisdiction over private action assumed but not decided for purposes of venue discussion).
43. 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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violations of the securities acts, including section 206. The district court held
that the practice of recommending securities to customers prior to the
appearance of the recommendations in weekly market letters was a fraudulent
and deceptive device. 44 Quoting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and section 206, the court stated that rule 10b-5, "together with the foregoing
statutory authority, is now . . . considered to support private litigation for
practically any sin of omission or commission which may be imagined in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. '45 Unfortunately, the court
never clarified which "foregoing statutory authority" it had in mind.
Young v. Seaboard Corp.4 6 was less equivocal. The complaint alleged
violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, section 17 of the Investment
Company Act47 and section 206. In denying defendants' motion to dismiss the
complaint, the court discussed in detail only section 10(b), but stated in
passing that "the claims of plaintiffs under . . . the Investment Advisers Act
... appear sufficient to withstand the present motion to dismiss. "48 However,
two very recent cases departed from the unexplained holding in Young. The
Southern District of Florida, in Greenspan v. Campos Del Toro, 49 held that no
cause of action for damages exists under the Act. 50 The court observed that
whereas the jurisdictional section of the Investment Company Act5 ' gives
district courts jurisdiction " 'of all suits in equity and actions at law brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, this
subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder,' -52 the jurisdic-
tional section of the Investment Advisers Act, section 214, refers only to "suits
in equity" and makes no mention of "actions at law."'53 The court stated its
belief that if any implied right of action exists under the Act, an injunction
would be the only available remedy. 54 Shortly thereafter, the Southern
44. Id. at 1082.
45. Id. at 1083.
46. 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1970).
48. 360 F. Supp. at 497.
49. Civil No. 73-638 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Slip Opinion].
50. Id. at 2.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970).
52. Slip Opinion at 1-2, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970) (emphasis added).
53. Slip Opinion at 2. Section 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "The
district courts of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter or
the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and . . . of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation
• . . thereunder."
54. This reasoning appears to represent an application of the doctrine that enumeration in a
statute of certain of a class of things raises an inference the lawgiver intended to exclude those
things not enumerated-expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This doctrine was employed recently
by the Supreme Court in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974). There, the Court examined § 307(a) of the Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C. § 547(a)
(1970), which, inter alia, provides a right of action to private parties in cases involving labor
agreements. The Court inferred from this limited right of action a congressional intent to
withhold a private right of action in other types of cases. The Court further supported this
conclusion by pointing out that the House of Representatives had rejected a draft provision
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District of California, in Gamniage v. Roberts, Scott & Co.,'' held that no
private cause of action existed under the Act.- 6
The opinion in BolgerS7 cited neither Greenspan nor Gammage, and un-
doubtedly the court was unaware of these cases. s 8 In departing from their
reasoning, the court did not rely specifically on the "statutory tort"" or "void
contract '60 analysis characteristic of many implied civil liability cases. In-
stead, it relied on the more generalized reasoning of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 6'
which in finding an implied private right of action under an antifraud
provision 62 similar to section 206, declared that "under the circumstances here
authorizing suit by any aggrieved party regardless of the gravamen of the action 414 U.S. at
458-60. The court in Greenspan pointed to no similar legislative history.
55. [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,761 (S.D. Cal. June 25, 1974).
56. Id. at 49,505 (alternative holding). The court in Gammage discussed its holding only
briefly and its reasoning appears unsound, since it relied heavily on Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund,
Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), which never reached the
merits of the § 206 complaint, and Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F 2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961),
vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962) (per curiam), which was subsequently criticized and
disapproved by the same court. See notes 31, 46 supra and accompanying text-
57. Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 iS D N Y
1974).
58. The Greenspan decision formed the basis for the subsequent motion for reargument in
Bolger. Id. at 267-68. Gammage was decided only one day before Bolger.
59. The "statutory tort" doctrine provides a remedy to a plaintiff damaged by another's
violation of a statute. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa- 1946), the
court relied on § 286 of the Restatement of Torts in establishing implied civil liability under rule
lOb-5: " 'The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if: (a) the intent of
the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and (b)
the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect.' " 69 F. Supp. at 513. See.
e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 658 n.12 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974), noted in 42 Fordham L. Rev. 688 (1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Common Cause v.
Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 810-11 (D.D.C. 1971). See also Bell v Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210. 213 (1944);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916).
60. Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78&clb) (1970), which
expressly voids any contract in violation of the Act, has been construed to give the aggrieved
party an action for damages, as well as other remedies. E.g., Eastside Church of Christ v.
National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968); Goldstein v.
Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 426-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see generally 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1757-63 (2d ed. 1961). Section 215(b) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1970), is
virtually identical with § 29(b).
61. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), noted in 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1336 (1964); 50 Cornell L.Q. 370 (1965);
59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 809 (1965).
62. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1973), was promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the
rulemaking authority contained in § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1970). The rule provides in part: "No solicitation [for proxies] shall be made by means of
any . . . communication, written or oral, containing any statement which is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact .... "
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it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. '63 This led the Bolger
court to inquire whether a damage action under section 206 would comport
with congressional intent and effectuate the purposes of the section. 64 The
court answered in the affirmative, relying on the broad language in Capital
Gains65 and the Senate66 and House Reports 67 accompanying the Advisers
Act. The opinion concluded that:
Based on the foregoing expressions of legislative purpose, it is clear that plaintiffs...
who were defrauded out of substantial sums of money by their investment advisers,
fall squarely within the class of persons whom . . . Section 206 [was] intended to
protect.
68
The court next confronted the argument which had prevailed in Greenspan,
namely that section 206 provided no private remedy at law, as distinct from
equitable relief. 69 The court observed that section 22 of the Securities Act, 70
section 27 of the Exchange Act 7' and section 44 of the Investment Company
Act7 2 grant district courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at
law,"'73 but that section 214 of the Advisers Act 74 omitted any reference to
"actions at law." Nonetheless, the court held that a right of action for
damages as well as injunctive relief was implied in the Act. 75 The opinion
reasoned that since the Advisers Act was the only one of these statutes which
did not provide for any civil liability, 7 6 such language was unnecessary and
its absence did not imply congressional intent to withhold jurisdiction over
implied remedies at law. 77 Accordingly, the court concluded that a cause of
63. 377 U.S. at 433.
64. 381 F. Supp. at 263, citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
65. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
66. " 'The nature of the functions of investment advisers . .. their potential influence on
security markets and the dangerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon
unsophisticated investors, convinces this Committee that protection of investors requires the
regulation of investment advisers on a national scale.' "381 F. Supp. at 263, quoting S. Rep. No.
1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940).
67. "[T]he Advisers Act was designed to:
'... protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters
. . .and to safeguard honest investment advisers against the stigma of the activities of these
individuals . 381 F. Supp. at 263, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28
(1940).
68. 381 F. Supp. at 263.
69. See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970).
71. Id. § 78aa.
72. Id. § 80a-43.
73. 381 F. Supp. at 264.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970); see note 53 supra.
75. 381 F. Supp. at 265.
76. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
77. 381 F. Supp. at 264-65.
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action for damages would lie under section 206 against all defendants, and
denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. 78
As applied to the defendant general partners, who admitted, for purposes
of the motion, to being statutory investment advisers, 79 Bolger represents
nothing more than the extension to one more securities statute of the well-
entrenched trend towards implied civil liability. However, on rehearing the
court squarely held that accountants who aid and abet investment advisers in
violating section 206 are jointly liable for damages. 80 This holding is more
controversial, in view of the specific wording of the Act.
The court was unimpressed with defendant accountants' argument that,
whereas section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states that it shall be unlawful for
"any person"8' to employ a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance,
section 206 refers only to investment advisers, and thus could not embrace
accountants. Such a reading of the statute, the court said, would be "pedantic
and technical. '8 2 It declared that the alleged fraudulent activities by the
accountants
were inexorably intertwined with the fraud being perpetrated against the limited
partners by [the] investment advisers. To deny to these investors, who were injured by
this combined fraudulent conduct, a cause of action against all of the wrongdoers
would leave the plaintiffs with half a remedy and would run afoul of the Supreme
Court's repeated admonition that the securities laws are to be construed "not techni-
cally and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes."83
The Investment Advisers Act refers to and differentiates between
"persons,"'8 4 "persons associated with an investment adviser, ' 8 5 and "invest-
ment advisers."'8 6 Notably, section 206 refers only to "any investment ad-
viser." In extending aiding and abetting liability under section 206 to accoun-
tants, the court in effect interpreted the words "any investment adviser" to
include "any person." Concededly, there is support in the Second Circuit for
the proposition that a party may be liable for aiding and abetting a securities
violation even though he would be outside the scope of the statute were he the
78. Id. at 265.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 268.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
82. 381 F. Supp. at 268.
83. Id., quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). Perhaps
significantly, the court, in refusing to dismiss the claim against the accountants, alternatively
stated that in any event there were properly pendent common law claims. 381 F. Supp. at 268.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(16) (1970). " 'Person' means a natural person or a company." Id.
85. Id. § 80b-2(a)(17). "The term 'person associated with an investment adviser' means any
partner, officer, or director of such investment adviser (or any person performing similar
functions), or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such investment
adviser, including any employee of such investment adviser .... " Id.
86. The definition specifically excludes, inter alia, accountants, brokers, engineers, lawyers
and teachers whose performance of such services is "solely incidental to the practice of [their]
profession." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1l) (1970).
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only defendant sued.8 7 On the other hand, other cases appear to restrict
aiding and abetting liability to the range of defendants expressly delineated in
the statute. 88 The Bolger court contributed nothing to the judicial precision
desirable in securities law when it failed to confront this issue of first
impression under section 206.
The Bolger court arguably could have reached the same conclusion without
ignoring the limitations of the statutory definition of investment advisers if it
had relied on section 209 of the Advisers Act 89 in order to hold the defendant
accountants liable for damages. Section 209(e) provides, inter alia, for injunc-
tive and criminal penalties for "aiders and abettors"90 of violations of the Act.
87. Speaking to the liability of the president of defendant issuer for his part in a distribution
of unregistered stock in violation of § 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), the Second
Circuit declared that "[e]ven if he did not directly cause the Progress Report to be transmitted..
he aided and abetted the furtherance of the unlawful scheme by the major participants." SEC v.
North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 81 (2d Cir. 1970). The Second Circuit
developed this idea further in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). There, while
discussing the liability of a lawyer for the issuance of a misleading opinion letter in connection
with an illegal distribution of unregistered stock, the court held that "[the district court] properly
recognized that if Schiffman's opinion letter were in fact used to sell unregistered Spectrum stock
• . . although his status as an 'underwriter' might be uncertain, he could be liable, nevertheless,
as an aider and abettor to Marder's illicit venture." Id. at 541 (footnotes omitted).
88.. A series of cases under § 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) (antifraud
provision providing remedy for those in privity of contract with defendant) appears to restrict
aiding and abetting liability to those who are either in privity with plaintiff or who control or are
controlled by a defendant in privity, as expressly provided in § 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1970). Barlas v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
91,674, at 95,478 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Winter v. D. J. & M. Inv. & Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943,
946 (S.D. Cal. 1960); see Jackson Tool & Die, Inc. v. Smith, 339 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1964); cf.
Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959). But cf. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503
F.2d 1100, 1105-11 (7th Cir. 1974) (aiding and abetting standards under rule lob-5 and the
common law); Buchholtz v. Rernard, 188 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). It is possible to read the
Barlas line of cases as simply holding that no extrastatutory aiding and abetting doctrine exists.
This would place them in conflict with more recent authority recognizing the doctrine in securities
law. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597 (1972).
89. Section 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970), which deals with enforcement of the Act, reads
in pertinent part: "Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has engaged, is
engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of
this subchapter . . . or that any person has aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, [or] induced
.. . such a violation, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the
United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices .... "
90. See note 88 supra. The general federal "aider and abettor" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
(1970), provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or produces its commission, is punishable as a principal." On facts somewhat
similar to those in Bolger, the court in ICC v. Blue Diamond Prods. Co., 93 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.
Iowa 1950), applied this statute. There, the Interstate Commerce Commission sought to enjoin
defendant manufacturer from inducing violation of a federal law regulating motor carriers.
Rejecting defendant's contention that the provisions of the statute applied only to motor carriers
themselves, the court said: "[Slince the defendant in this action may be prosecuted criminally for
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Significantly, the section extends to "any person" rather than investment
advisers alone. Since, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the accountant
defendants admitted to aiding and abetting the adviser defendants in violat-
ing the Act,9' the section appears applicable. As discussed above, the implica-
tion of private rights of action for damages under the securities laws is firmly
established. Consequently, the court could have found an implied right of
action under section 206 as against the investment adviser and under section
209 as against the accountants, although the language of section 209 is not
readily subject to as broad a reading as is, for example, section 10 of the 1934
Act.92
Bolger represents a determination that section 206 stands on the same
footing as other antifraud provisions in the securities acts. Whether it will
settle the running debate concerning implied civil liability under section 206
remains to be seen. In the meantime, however, the Bolger court may have
created another debate over the aiding and abetting question. The one
certainty Bolger provides is that section 206 is likely to assume more promi-
nence in future antifraud complaints.
James E. Connors
the violations alleged in the complaint... no good reason appears why this rule should not be
applied with like force in a civil proceeding to restrain the same violations." Id. at 690.
91. 381 F. Supp. at 262.
92. Compare § 209, set out in note 89 supra, which refers specifically to the SEC as the
proper party in an action, with the broad language of section 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970), which
simply declares that certain actions by "any person" are "unlawful." Plaintiffs could not sue
under § 10 because they had not purchased or sold securities. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); 42 Fordharn L. Rev. 688 (1974).
For a discussion of the problem of implying a private right of action, see Note. The Phenomenon
of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or
Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 441 (1974).
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